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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1927

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West German Commentary

Bonn IWE-TAGESDIENST in German No 99, 8 Jul 81 pp 2-3

[Report from Berlin: "Reorganizations of Disaster Control in the GDR." A translation of the East Berlin GESETZBLATT decree cited below follows this report]

[Text] The East Berlin Council of Ministers has published a new decree on disaster control. It goes into effect on 15 July, rescinding corresponding provisions of 1971. Disaster control in the GDR remains a part of civil defense, but its central management now comes under the Council of Ministers, no longer under the civil defense chief. A central disaster commission is being set up under the Council of Ministers to coordinate all disaster control measures. In addition, special government commission may be set up. The new decree provides broader and more specific rights in disaster control for the local council chairmen. They now have the right to issue instructions to all enterprises and facilities in the disaster area and may compel GDR citizens who are able to work to perform in it. New is the provision that the preparation and implementation of measures in preventing and fighting against disasters in border areas and restricted military areas must be authorized by the military command.

Text of Decree

East Berlin GESETZBLATT DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK in German Part I No 20, 29 Jun 81 pp 257-260

[Official text of "Decree of 15 May 1981 on Disaster Control" signed by W. Stoph, chairman, Council of Ministers, 15 May 1981]

[Text] On behalf of a uniform preparation and implementation of effective disaster control measures, on the basis of Article 15 of the Defense Law of 13 October 1978 (GBL, Part I No. 35 p 377) on the implementation of Articles 5 and 6 in that law, and on the basis of Article 5 of the introductory law of the GDR Labor Code of 16 June 1977 (GBL, Part I No. 18 p 228), the following is decreed:

Article 1

(1) Disaster control is part of civil defense. Its task is to protect the population, the economy, the vital facilities and cultural values from disasters.

(2) Disaster control entails
--preventative disaster control and
--defense and countermeasures against disasters and the elimination of their effects (termed countermeasures against disasters in the following).

The main efforts are to be directed at effective preventative disaster control.

(3) Disaster control is concerned in particular with
--(a) presciently recognizing, disclosing in time and immediately eliminating sources of danger which facilitate or could lead to disasters;
--(b) taking fast and effective countermeasures against disasters that have occurred by fully using all personnel and material resources and normalizing public life;
--(c) ensuring order and security under disaster conditions.

Article 2

(1) Disasters in the sense of this decree are grave natural events including extreme weather phenomena and other cases of damage or misfortune large in scale and, normally, beyond a local level, countermeasures against which call for a coordinated employment of forces, material and technical means and for uniform, complex territorial leadership.

(2) Industrial accidents are no disasters in the sense of this decree. Preventing and fighting against them goes in accordance with regulations issued for it.

Article 3

(1) The central state management of the disaster control measures is the obligation of the Council of Ministers.

(2) For the uniform management and coordination of countermeasures against disasters a central disaster commission is formed under the Council of Ministers.

(3) To direct the countermeasures against disasters, government commission may be assigned on orders from the Council of Ministers or its chairman.

Article 4

(1) The ministers and the heads of the other central state organs, the managers of economic management organs, combines, enterprises and facilities and the chairmen of the cooperatives, in their capacity as heads of civil defense, are accountable for the countermeasures against disasters in their fields of responsibility. In particular they are obligated
--(a) presciently to recognize and disclose in time sources of danger which facilitate or could lead to disasters, analyze or determine their potential effects and set down, and systematically realize, all measures needed for eliminating the sources of danger;

--(b) to make the necessary specific arrangements for the safety of the population, the protection of public property and the safeguarding of the reproduction process, to prepare management and information documents and always keep them up to date;
--(c) to prepare the capacities and means available to them for being used as countermeasures against disasters;
--(d) to ensure always strict management under disaster conditions; and
--(e) to exercise constant direction and control in implementation of the countermeasures against disasters.

(2) The managers of enteprises and facilities and the chairmen of the cooperatives, above and beyond the stipulations of section 1, are obligated
--(a) to submit the information and documents needed for territorial operational planning to the chairmen of the competent local councils; and
--(b) to make available the capacities and means available to them, if the situation calls for it, for assignments beyond the boundaries of their enterprise, if so instructed by the chairman of the competent local council.

Article 5

(1) In their capacity as heads of civil defense, the chairmen of the local councils are responsible for managing disaster control. In their given territories they are accountable for the complex planning, coordination and control of the measures in preventative disaster control and for the management of the countermeasures against disasters.

(2) To meet the tasks assigned to them in accordance with section 1, the chairmen of the local councils have the right
--(a) to issue instructions and assignments, in conformity with Article 5 section 4 of the Defense Law, to the heads of civil defense in the economic management organs, combines, enterprises, facilities and cooperatives, irrespective of their normal chains of command, as well as to the citizens;
--(b) to commit citizens that are able to work to take part in the countermeasures against disasters and to order the employment of manpower and of technical and material means of the enterprises in their territory, irrespective of normal chains of command and property relations. In government bureaus, enterprises and facilities of the centrally managed transportation system, the post office, the water economy, the construction industry and the coal and energy industry, and in areas of special national defense production, agreement must in principle be obtained from the head of the next higher organ, unless danger is imminent;
--(c) to sound the disaster alert when there is a danger of disaster or a disaster has suddenly occurred, to provide operational readiness of management organs, capacities and means, and to alert the population.

(3) In terms of preventative disaster control, the chairmen of the local councils have the duty, in particular,
--(a) to maintain a general view of all territorial foci of danger and of the effects that could arise from disasters;
--(b) to organize a uniform system for complex countermeasures against disasters and have prepared for it, based on the assessments of the danger foci, the requisite management and information documents;

--(c) to direct and control the state organs, enterprises, facilities and cooperatives in implementation of the tasks incumbent upon them with respect to preventative disaster control; and
--(d) to enlighten and inform the population about preventative measures and countermeasures against disasters.

(4) Through the countermeasures against disasters the chairmen of the local councils have to secure the uninterrupted management of the organs and capacities and means used that are involved in the elimination of the direct effects and in the normalization of public life. They are entitled to assign the management of direct countermeasures to heads of competent state or economic management organs.

(5) The chairmen of the local councils plan, coordinate, and control the measures of preventative disaster control and conduct the countermeasures against disasters with help from the civil defense staffs.

(6) If countermeasures against disasters require the use of capacities and means from various areas exceeding the boundaries of the bezirk, the head of the GDR civil defense is in charge of coordination, unless the chairman of the Council of Ministers issues different orders.

(7) Once the central disaster commission has started operating, the lord mayor of Berlin--GDR capital--and the chairmen of the bezirk councils (henceforth referred to as chairmen of the bezirk councils) have to direct their requests for a use of capacities and material means exceeding the boundaries of the bezirk at the chairman of the central disaster commission.

Article 6

The central direction and control of preventative measures against disasters, except as they concern the armed organs, is up to the chief of the GDR civil defense. Within the scope of this task assigned to him, he has the right
--(a) to ask for an accounting from the ministers (excepting the armed organs) and managers of the other central state organs and the bezirk council chairmen, inspect the disaster control documents and reports, charge civil defense officers with inspecting them, and ask for information;
--(b) to order control measures and have controls carried out by civil defense officers or control groups including associates of the ministries and of other central state organs;
--(c) to analyze control results with the responsible persons and offer recommendations on the generalization of progressive experiences and the elimination of deficiencies ascertained;
--(d) to levy fines, to reconstitute legality, when violations or deficient handling of disaster control regulations have been determined; and
--(e) to request opinions in assessing major danger foci and in elaborating decision proposals, or request experts from the areas of the ministries and other central state organs.

Article 7

(1) For preparing and conferring on fundamental tasks and measures in preventing and fighting against disasters, the following advisory organs exist:
--(a) for the bezirk council chairmen, the bezirk disaster commissions; and
--(b) for the kreis council chairmen, the kreis disaster commissions.

In especially endangered towns and communities and in municipal districts of bezirk towns, the chairmen of the higher-level councils may order disaster commissions to be set up.

(2) Members of the disaster commissions are state and economic functionaries in the given territory. They are appointed members of the disaster commissions by the local council chairmen, irrespective of their normal subordination relationships.

(3) The activity of the disaster commissions does not infringe the personal responsibilities of the managers of state and economic management organs, combines, enterprises, facilities and of the chairmen of the cooperatives in their respective areas of responsibility.

(4) For solving specific tasks in disaster control, the local council chairmen have the right to assign groups of experts.

Article 8

(1) The preparation and implementation of measures in preventing and fighting against disasters in border areas, restricted national defense areas and in areas reserved for the armed organs and the civil defense are subject to agreement from the competent commanding officers or heads of the armed organs or of the civil defense.

(2) In reservations and mining areas measures for preventing and fighting against disasters require concurrence from the competent organs in control there.

Article 9

(1) The German People's Police, the fire department of the Ministry of the Interior, the local volunteer fire departments and the industrial fire departments solve the tasks they have in countering disasters on the basis of the law of 11 June 1968 on the tasks and authorities of the German People's Police (GBL, Part I No 11 p 232) or the law of 19 December 1947 on fire protection in the GDR--the fire protection law--(GBL, Part I No. 62 p 575). The use of capacities and means follows the instructions set up for it by the Ministry of the Interior and the Chief of the German People's Police.

(2) Requisite capacities and means of the NVA and the GDR border troops have to be requested by the bezirk council chairmen via the chiefs of the competent bezirk defense command of the NVA. Once the central disaster commission has started operating, Article 5 section 7 applies. Such capacities and means are employed, in conformity with military regulations issued, by the Minister of National Defense.

(3) In the case of imminent danger, the bezirk council chairmen may ask the bezirk authorities of the German People's Police and the chiefs, commanding officers and managers of the NVA or GDR border troops headquarters closest to the place of disaster to assign capacities and technical means without delay. The bezirk council chairmen have to inform the chiefs of the bezirk defense commands at once about it. The use of additional capacities and means of the NVA or the GDR border troops is subject to the stipulations of section 2.

Article 10

(1) All citizens have the obligation to report observations and determinations of existing sources of danger and of disasters that have occurred to the state organs and to take an active part in fighting against disasters.

(2) The state organs have the obligation to report at once information from the population or their own observation of sources of danger or of disasters that have occurred to the competent council chairman.

Article 11

(1) Working people recruited for participation in countermeasures against disasters are excused from their jobs, in conformity with Article 182 of the GDR Labor Code of 16 June 1977 (GBL, Part I No. 18 p 185). While on that assignment they are getting paid on the average wage level.

(2) Working people who were ready to do their job but could not meet their contractual labor commitment because of a disaster, in departing from the stipulations of Articles 84 to 88 in the Labor Code, are to be assigned different work in their enterprise or, if that is not possible, in a different enterprise where they live or elsewhere. As to their getting paid, the provisions of Articles 89 and 90 of the Labor Code then apply.

(3) For working people who because of a disaster-incurred traffic jam could not get to their job
--(a) the provision of section 1 apply when they can prove they made themselves available to the competent local state organs and were engaged in the countermeasures against the disaster; and
--(b) the provisions of Article 115 of the Labor Code apply when their conditions did not conform to those referred to under letter (a).

(4) While being engaged in countermeasures against disasters, insurance protection is in effect in conformity with legal regulations applying to it.*

Article 12

(1) State and economic management organs, combines, enterprises, facilities, cooperatives and social organizations must in principle bear the costs caused by countermeasures against disasters themselves.

*In effect at this time: Decree of 18 November 1969 on the insurance of state organs and state institutions (GBL, Part II No. 101 p 679), Decree of 11 April 1973 on expanding insurance benefits for accidents during social, cultural or sports activities (GBL, Part I No. 22 p 199).

(2) Financial compensation for the costs incurred by countermeasures against disasters may be requested
--by state-owned enterprises and facilities, from their superior organs; and
--by cooperatives, social organizations and enterprises under other forms of ownership, from their competent kreis council.
Such an application can be made only if the costs that have arisen can, by evidence, not be made up for by increased cost reduction efforts of their own or by thrifty economizing. Payments of financial compensation are up to management decision in the organs that have executive control over the enterprises and facilities or to the bezirk and kreis councils in their area of responsibility.

(3) To the extent that compensation cannot be made by the economic management organs, combines and local councils, the ministers, heads of other central state organs or the bezirk council chairmen have to send recommendations to the Council of Ministers to decide on the financing of such compensation.

Article 13

(1) Appeals are possible against decisions except those according to Article 12 and against fines in the field of disaster control.

(2) Such an appeal has to be submitted in writing or orally, by giving its reasons, no later than 2 weeks after the receipt of the decision or the fine notice to the chief who has made the decision or levied the fine.

(3) An appeal cannot be postponed.

(4) The competent chief has to decide on the appeal within 2 weeks after receiving it. If it is not, or not fully, accepted, it must be handed over within that period to a manager on a higher level. He makes the definitive decision within another 2 weeks.

(5) If in exceptional cases a decision cannot be made within that period, he who has made the appeal must in good time receive an interim report explaining the reasons for it and projecting the deadline date.

(6) Decision have to be explained to the appellant.

Article 14

(1) Anyone who deliberately or negligently
--(a) destroys, damages, misuses, removes, improperly deals with installations, facilities or equipment of disaster control or interferes with or prevents their use by other ways and means, whereby he slightly infringes measures for the prevention or fighting against disasters;
--(b) acts in violation of instructions or penalties in conformity with Article 5 section 2 letter (a) or Article 6 letters (b) or (c); or
--(c) neglects his obligation to prevent or fight against disasters in accordance with Article 4, Article 5 section 2 letter (b), or Article 10,
may receive a reprimand or a fine from M 10 to M 500.

(2) If a deliberate irregularity in terms of section 1 was committed out of gross contempt for the requirements of disaster control or repeatedly in the course of 2 years and punished by a fine, or if the deliberate irregularity caused, or could have caused, more serious damage, a fine up to M 1,000 may be levied.

(3) The adjudication in such proceedings is the responsibility of the local council chairmen.

(4) The conduct of the proceedings and the levying of fines come under the law of 12 January 1968 on fighting against irregularities--OWG--(GBL, Part I No 3 p 101).

Article 15

Implementation regulations for this decree are issued by the Minister of National Defense or the chief of the GDR civil defense.

Article 16

(1) This decree goes into effect on 15 July 1981.

(2) It rescinds the decree of 13 January 1971 on the prevention of and fighting against disasters (GBL, Part II No 16 p 117).

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CSO: 2300/5

MEDICAL TREATMENT DURING NATIONAL EMERGENCIES DISCUSSED

Magdeburg VOLKSSTIMME in German 19 Jun 81, Supplement p 4

[Article by Prof Eberhard Winkelvoss, MD, director, Military Medicine Department, Magdeburg Medical Academy: "Treatment in any Eventuality"]

> [Text] To do everything for the good of the people, for the happiness of man--therein lies the meaning of socialism. And most especially, a life in health, in the enjoyment of life and with efficiency all the way to old age is part and parcel of it. Therefore the 10th party congress has resolved: the sociopolitical program for improving our citizens' quality of life is resolutely being carried on through the achievements of our people and the strength of socialism despite all foreign economy burdens. Imperialism, however, envies the successes in our economic and social policy. It fears the radiation of social security, full employment, educational policy and economic stability, fears the continued recognition of our GDR on the international scale as a state of peace, an efficient industrial state. Again there is saber rattling, again they are pushing their top mobilization and high profit policy. After more than 35 years of peace, the supreme human right--the right to life--and our citizens' basic need for peaceful work in the interest of further improving the material foundations of our life are threatened most severely. This forces our state to take precautions for any eventuality.

GDR health and welfare by the end of 1979 had 33,089 physicians, i.e., one physician for every 506 inhabitants, one on call for every 957 inhabitants.

The 10th party congress balance-sheet furthermore stated that our fast medical aid system had been developed in all bezirk towns and many kreises. That system has proven itself well, we know, in our city and most kreises in our bezirk. The urgent house-call service assures around the clock house calls to more seriously ill citizens, relatively fast, by a physician in basic medical care. He starts the treatment that may be necessary, makes further arrangements and, if necessary, has the patient transferred to a hospital.

Our emergency medical services, furthermore, is specialized mobile medical emergency treatment which can quickly be dispatched, by ambulance, to someone in a life-threatening situation, who has become ill, has been wounded or has been in an accident, bringing the needed medicines and medical-technical facilities and a medical specialist to him. Under medical observation and with the chance for further medical care he is then transported to specialized stationary facilities.

Emergency Groups in Operation

Fast medical aid also is ready, with public health officials and the comrades of the German Red Cross, when there are larger accidents with many casualties. One emergency group, composed of a medical specialist, a first-aid specialist and a medic as a driver, in an ambulance equipped with emergency medical facilities and radio, is dispatched in accidents where up to five persons were seriously hurt, five moderately hurt and 40 slightly hurt.

When twice as many were hurt, i.e., up to hundred persons need medical aid, the radio station dispatches two emergency groups.

Three groups are assigned when there are up to 20 seriously hurt, 20 moderately hurt and 160 slightly hurt persons. The medical specialist, to be able to give effective medical aid in situ must rapidly find, and diagnose, the sick or wounded in a life-threatening situation. He must rate the casualties, i.e., find those who must get medical aid at once and cannot wait because their vital functions are threatened, those that can wait a while for a medical aide or physician, and those who can wait longer without any additional harm coming to them.

Medical Protection for the Population

Especially in recent weeks, during Comrade Erich Honecker's official visit to Japan, commemorating the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with a memorial for those victims being unveiled, we were once again made aware of the imperialist annihilation strikes against Japan and of the planned use of means of mass destruction by the NATO armies. But we also know from those bombings and from U.S. experiments in the Nevada desert that knowing the effective factors in mass destruction weapons, proper conduct, deliberate actions and the correct use of even simple possibilities will make survival possible and can often absolutely avoid all health damage.

The mission of our society and of our health and welfare system is to create the objective and subjective preconditions for providing our population, through civil defense, with effective medical protection.

Medical protection for the population through civil defense means the work of health and welfare in the defense situation, enabling the associates, through training and material equipment, to preserve the lives of as many as possible in case of aggression and the enormously high number of wounded in its wake, avoid complications for all that have been saved, if possible, and repair their working and living conditions as fast as possible. Enabling health and welfare to work successfully in the situation of socialist national defense then also is a sure precondition for coping with medical aid for persons hurt in natural and industrial disasters. Medical protection for the population through civil defense is a complex of meaningfully interacting measures and mutually dependent components.

Aware Participation Is Demanded

During a science conference of the Medical Society in early 1981, Professor Hinderer of Halle, the noted jurist and member of the medical-juridical working circle of the GDR, said to the physicians of our bezirk that they must be well prepared and trained for providing medical care under catastrophic conditions because panic and chaos seldom suggest the right decisions.

There are three major aspects for providing the population with medical protection: (1) an aware participation by the population; (2) measures for steady production and distribution of goods; and (3) assigning, and training, operational forces in the civil defense formations.

Aware participation, conscious conduct by the population is possible only when the effects of mass destruction weapons are known, which makes rapid and correct action possible. That is served by informing the population, which must be handled, in the enterprises, cooperatives and organizations, under the personal responsibility of the state manager, in terms of a 14-topic program, and is to be carried out also in residential areas.

Ninth grade civil defense training and at the universities and technical schools serves the same purpose. University students have to be trained as leadership personnel for civil defense formations. That we are now intensifying our civil defense training must be seen as a matter of catching up, as it were, because all socialist states have long had that kind of training systems. Targeted activities to that end have been carried on since 1952 in the capitalist states like the United States. Schools and universities give instruction in survival, the organs of U.S. civil readiness conducting basic courses and one-year college courses.

Securely Coping With Selfhelp

Another task lies in creating preconditions for securely placing the citizens in their residential area and enterprise. Right now we have the assignment to build in principle, such protective structures into all large buildings, rest homes, children's facilities and polyclinics, making them airtight or placing them under detritus or putting them in afterwards. The specific medical protection serves the instruction in the handling of so-called structural breathing and body protection devices and the production and use of makeshift protection possibilities. This also includes instruction and practice in simple selfhelp and mutual medical aid measures that can be learned easily, which constitutes an indispensable prerequisite for successful help in medical-military treatment given in the communications zone. Through such simple measures, properly carried out, one's own life and the life of one's neighbor shall be preserved until trained medical care by health workers, medical aides, physicians and nurses arrives. That also means placing the wounded in the proper position so that they do not choke, inhale mucus or vomit, and keep their respiratory channels open. It also includes applying sterile bandages to avoid contamination or infection.

The special knowledge in medical aid includes th applying of tourniquets, to tie off strong arterial bleedings, temporary bracing against pain and stabilization against shock. Urgent, immediate, critical medical aid means artificial respiration and external heart pressure massage that briefly, temporarily, affects automatic centers.

It is imperative for every citizen to be familiar with these immediate measures in emergency medicine and for every medical aide, health assistant, everyone, in fact, to apply and cope with them properly, so that under any condition help can be provided effectively, as many lives can be saved as possible and complications can be averted as well as permanent disability and incapacity for possibly all that have been rescued.

Deploying Civil Defense Formations

Operational civil defense personnel and formations are deployed with an eye to population figures, population densities, territorial structure and industrial sprawls, and here the principle has to be emphasized that these people are working people who along with their handling their production obligations acquire technical skills and practical abilities for making ever more expedient use of the constantly improving general and technical equipment. These formations serve a rapid and successful implementation of recovery and repair projects that might become necessary such as

--salvage activites;
--providing first aid;
--providing initial medical aid;
--decontamination, deactivation and disinfecting;
--hygienic-anti-epidemic measures; and
--many other skilled and specialized activities that might become necessary to engage in successful action against any kind of virulence.

The GDR is a state that has a consistent peace policy and an economic and social policy that serves none but the welfare of the people. It threatens no one. Its work is aimed at the constantly growing material and cultural standard of living of its people. It could grow still faster and be higher, were we not forced by imperialism to apply all measures for the protection of our citizens, for the secure protection of the life and achievements in our socialist fatherland.

5885
CSO: 2300/1

'MTI' OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON ROLE OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS

Budapest ELET ES IRODALOM in Hungarian 29 Aug 81 p 7

[Interview with Dr Tamas Szecsko, manager of the Mass Communications Research Center of Hungarian Radio and Television, by Istvan Wisinger: "The Timid Giant: A Conversation about the Contradictions of Electronics"]

[Text] Our era, with some exaggeration, used to be called the era of television. But there is no exaggeration at all in saying that simultaneously we have become eyewitnesses and actors in that revolution in mass communication which has television in its focal point. Using the name given to it by McLuhan, the famous American sociologist, the "timid giant" has taken courage: with its explosion-like growth the electronics industry all over the world is becoming the most important means of relaying decisive changes. The so-called global television has come within reach with the aid of the manmade satellites, and the "holy trinity" of entertainment, information and dissemination of knowledge will soon be joined also by the fourth social function of television viewing: that of providing services. The first phase of this process is popularization of the recording of TV sound, teletext [sic] and picture recording. The second phase will be the coupled use of the telephone, the computer and the television set. This process is taking place simultaneously, and is spreading while supplementing one another. Dr Tamas Szecsko, manager of the Mass Communications Research Center of Hungarian Radio and Television speaks about some of the basic characteristics and social consequences of this situation.

[Question] How could the significance of this process be illustrated with a good, practical example?

[Answer] A recently established American magazine reported on the most bizarre consequences of the change: soon people will be getting paid to watch TV. According to the calculations, the hourly wage of 50 cents to $1 appears to be economical. The guiding role in all this, of course, belongs to the advertising industry, which in the classic era of TV watching "buys" a certain number of the viewing masses from the owner of the TV company, and in exchange for this the financing firm's products are advertised on the given channel. And the viewers do not pay a subscription fee. After this came cable television, and in this system some of the viewers paid for the absence of advertisers on the program. Now the table has turned: the firms are even willing to pay the viewers not to see that program--on cable--on which advertisements are also seen.

[Question] Such influence of the advertising industry is not operational in this country, but I think we are also arriving at the gate of the second era. Why is it that in this country the viewer notices precious little of the new era's phenomena?

[Answer] The fact that we can not "play" with the new tools of communication. Due to the limited nature of our society's resources--I could also word it more drastically: because we are poor--we are not in the historical situation of luxury of being able to run glass fiber optics cables into several hundred homes and thus model with this "game," costing billions, the possibilities of mass utilization of relaying information by means of glass cables. Or, of experimenting with the zero-series video disc's development. This situation is forced on us, and we share it with quite a few European countries better developed than we are. However, we can for the most part blame ourselves for not looking the facts in the eye in our plans and prognostications: the electronics revolution is here at our border, and it is even within the country now. In my opinion the reason for our shortsightedness is multiple confusion of thought, a split in our conscious in the areas of information policy and cultural policy. In our system of social institutions we still have not found the place mass information--or, with a more classical term: agitation and propaganda--deserves in the third of the twentieth century. I think that the priority of politics can truly prevail not in opposition to information but rather by means of the very same thing. On the other hand, our public educational system--even if not by declaration, but certainly in its reflexes--still considers television to be some kind of a foreign object. (Not so much any more with radio). And it has a particular aversion towards those new tools which it can see only in outlines, if it can see them at all.

[Question] What is it that it should already be able to see?

[Answer] For example, that there are so many picture recorders in the country that we should methodically watch their use. But this has not yet sank into the conscious. Just as it also has not that in addition to the two domestic TV channels at least two other stations from abroad can be received almost everywhere; at some places, as many as four or five. For example, almost 3 million [Hungarians] can watch the Austrian TV's program. And, what is even more: the reception area of foreign TV programs will significantly expand within years by means of the already operating and proliferating cables of the large community antenna systems and the manmade satellites which beam the programs directly. And on some sets soon one will be able to also read a picture tube text which will be able to be "turned" like the pages of a newspaper. And the program cassettes and discs made abroad will hardly pass us by. The electronic games are popular, and even now they are not beyond financial reach. The communications technology can already now do what we will only ask it to do 20 years from now.

[Question] Isn't this an exaggeration? Or a utopia, with the practical questions of which it is too soon to deal?

[Answer] No. The present society has no communication desires or needs which could not be satisfied with the current technology. But, let's say, 20 years from now, if a person connected into the complex information system feels in his apartment that he needs a certain microbiological information from the library or the archives of a research institute in Paris, he can already now fulfill this

curiosity with technology's present situation. Our informational fantasy is more finite than technology's possibilities.

[Question] Will the "cold waves" of the international political situation perhaps stand in the way of future progress?

[Answer] Fortunately or unfortunately, but no. This "progress" is very contradictory. That is, we must not forget that in the final analysis the advanced telecommunication, or even the electronic entertainment industry is a civilian "distillate" of the military industry. On the other hand, it is also obvious that in a more tense international situation the ideological battle also becomes sharper, thus the tools of "battle:" the mass communication media are developing almost at a forced rate. But no matter at what rate the periods of easing and tension keep replacing each other, development of the communication technologies continues. There is no alternative to that!

[Question] It seems certain that the technical separation between telecommunication and mass information will soon cease to exist. Telephone and radio will become integrated, and the transmission and cable relay of the programs, information and signals will be intertwined with each other. It is a new phenomenon, however, that to some extent this process will be independent of the central decisions.

[Answer] Initially nobody owns the new technology, due to the very reason of its newness. In this country the large community antenna systems and the development of teletext have arrived in this important phase. Many of the former are already operating in this country. The largest one is the one in Szekesfehervar where theoretically 20,000 homes can receive 7 TV programs (and both standards of the UHF radio bands) from one single antenna. And at the same time the councils and the educational institutions can also use it to forward information, manage traffic, and remotely control the water works and remote heating facilities. The situation in teletext's case is that among the socialist countries, so far only in this country have adaptation development and transmission experiments been conducted. But if this lack of ownership will continue long, our problems will only increase. Instead of taking advantage of the benefits the system offers. The outlines of a dual task are becoming evident: it would be desirable to centrally organize as soon as possible the technological and legal conditions of the new communication technologies, and at the same time no limitations should be placed on--on the contrary, we should expand--the community and residential initiatives already developed.

[Question] In the final analysis, are the reasons for the slow-down and for the backwardness financial, or ideological?

[Answer] Perhaps the economists will stone me, but in my opinion it has financial obstacles because the ideological reasons have too much influence. We could provide partial assistance against the backwardness by regrouping our financial resources, or by distributing them differently. Just one example: the construction and maintenance of a cultural development house consumes significant funds to supply a limited stratus of the population, when the same sum could satisfy the needs of a much broader stratus in the form of television investment. An obvious counterjustification is that by contrasting the two different types of institutions I am confusing different kinds of relationship and institutional systems, since

the cultural development houses also make it possible for the population to personally and actively participate. However, the automatic nature of the contrast is the very thing indicating the ideological backwardness, since television could also be used to educate for personal and active participation. The poorer our economic situation, the better we must concentrate our resources. In international forums I feel at times that our ideology is less modern than that of the developing countries. That is, in those countries the growth of the existing communication systems is taking place so fast that they have no choice but recognize: the newest communication technology is the most economical.

[Question] What could be the consequences if the world surrounding us, and mainly if our ideological foes get significantly ahead of us?

[Answer] The world will be here even more so within the borders of this small country: in terms of information, entertainment, and the spreading of values. Even though subjectively it is possible not to like this situation, but objectively it will accelerate the development of information systems. It is therefore smarter to take it into our calculations, rather than trying to ignore it. There is no way we can answer the challenge by isolating ourselves. Of course, the big question is how general this recognition is, and how well will it urge action in the various institutions and shops. Active and offensive counterstrategy is needed, the essence of which is: to increase our own authenticity, our own credibility. The information policy which treats the population as adults must be continued even more consistently in the new situation. And that starts out from the fact that the socialist democracy generates a demand for large volumes of information. And also from the fact that mass politicking also has cultural prerequisites--and vice versa.

[Question] Are these realistic ideas even considering the technological backwardness?

[Answer] Partially, yes. In my opinion we do have some intellectual reserves suitable to initiate the process. Especially if we recognize that the improvement of quality is closely related to the spreading of democratism. Tibor Vamos stated at the most recent general meeting of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in connection with the social consequences of this country's technological progress: "...ahead of us stands the possibility of a society with qualitatively different composition, and one with a different quality of government." One of the most important tools and spreaders of promoting such thoughts can be the television, practically as a matter of necessity. It can provide much help to democratization by spreading information, proving models, and spreading the values. Of course, the decisive majority of our tasks falls along the lines of information policy and educational policy. In both areas we must dynamically, healthily and flexibly conform to the new social and technological circumstances. More must be expected of television than what we now receive from it--mainly as far as quality is concerned--, but we cannot make it responsible for everything and dispense of it with a wave of the hand if it does not meet our demands. The conditions for ideologican change have to be created, for example, also for the television but the investment will return many times over, financially as well as intellectually.

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KISZ COUNCIL OF YOUNG INTELLECTUALS MEETS

Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 6 Sep 81 p 7

[Report by Zoltan Gyulay, "Social Processes And Our Lives-Meeting of Young Intellectuals"]

[Text] Our society is characterized by people's search for their place [in life]; the search for a place and for tasks also involves youth in its every-day life. In reaching the successive degrees of development, the socialist intelligentsia's and intellectual youth's search for a place comes to the foreground in each new period. Their ever more important role in the world and our lives means not only rights and benefits but also responsibilities; this stratum, which plays an important role in our society, can carry out its tasks only if the columns of "liabilities" and "assets" are well balanced with one another.

This recognition is becoming even more general although the maturing of the process that has been started will require many years. The council of intellectual youth of the KISZ's CC organized the other day its third conference on the tasks of intellectual youth and on the experience gained in their work, with the participation of all representatives of the stratum involved. The speeches and debates (delivered by Tibor Fekete, secretary of the intellectual council, by Janos Barabas, secretary of the State Youth Committee, by Mrs Laszlo Kopf, secretary of the KISZ's CC, and by Valeria Benke, member of the Political Committee and chief editor of the Social Review) emphasized the characteristics which originated from the new circumstances.

It has been ten years now that the dealing with (or more precisely, the concern about) youth assumed institutional forms. The party's resolution on youth policy resulted in the youth law but the tasks included in the statutes were not carried out fully everywhere. There are portfolios, for example, the chiefs of which have just recently signed the executive directive and the implementation plan. And the world around us has changed in the meantime, of course, and new questions came to the center of debates. Earlier it was only the surface from which many people drew the conclusions; today it is customary to generalize on the basis of individual phenomena. Both are, of course, detrimental.

The debate on the relationship between youth and Marxism grew into polemics on social pressures while the changes reflecting our everyday lives (the increase of the number of teenagers, the slack in new marriages, the new tendencies in divorce statistics) were built into the organized structures to a lesser degree. Although our youth's ideal and ideological attitude scores high in international comparisons, intellectual youth cannot be examined as a homogeneous community: it is made up

of various groups. This must always be taken into consideration whenever intellectual youth is the topic on any forum. A clear definition of concepts may help in exploring the foundation of the struggle against petty bourgeoise views, of religion and nationalism, i.e., they may help the KISZ carry out its correctly determined tasks.

The phenomena's explanation is already leading us closer to the solution. It may seem strange but it is true: while the church's influence on youth is decreasing, youth is becoming more religious or at least is not becoming less religious. This is actually understandable, for no one has yet written the "modern ten commandments" to substitute for the old moral values. Nationalism, on the other hand, is nurtured by the interest in cultural history and by the fashion of folklore which, by keeping traditions alive, has a beneficial effect but may also result in distorted conclusions.

These are actually the reasons that made the conference necessary; the time of the conference was well chosen, for the KISZ's 10th congress has been dealing with the problem in its own way and has come up with a program. The social processes stand in the center of attention and the KISZ is assuming responsibility for decreasing the dangers facing youth and for taking care of the talented. This is a laconic formulation that does not even include the entire range of the KISZ's work; but its contents are diverse, so much the more as they also include all of the existential questions.

The present intensive period of development can be seen in all facets of life, and creates the problems of both training and beginning at a new job. Our country occupies a very low rank in international statistics on the number of university students, and the tensions of absolute and relative overproduction are made worse by the contraditions of employment. For while in certain areas there is a lack of trained personnel, people trained in those areas work outside of those areas or even in areas that are totally different from their own.

Housing is also a question that involves one's life style and determines one's attitude. It has been on the floor for years, for the KISZ is also safeguarding the interests of Hungarian youth; this is why the initiatives in alleviating or eliminating the problems must be supported. And we must also deal with the salaries of young intellectuals about which there are numerous delusions. The group's average of 4,000 forints monthly income is 11 percent higher than the average income; however, there are wide deviations, for 60 percent of the group earn less than the average and 15 percent earn considerably more than the average.

These problems were debated in nine categories: the young agronomists, lawyers, researchers, engineers/economists, artists, social educators, health specialists, teachers and journalists had their own separate conferences. According to the original plans, they were supposed to work out an action program but the plans were subsequently changed: they made proposals for the programs of their own given organizations. The difference in name also means a difference in contents, for it shows that, on the basis of the "central menu," the KISZ organizations and the young people may determine themselves their own preferred tasks and thus the basis of independence is being established.

The nicest thing about the entire debate was that everyone was concerned about what young intellectuals could do for society including their own future. The teachers said that working conditions would deteriorate during the next 5 years and, because of an increase of 200,000 of grade schoolers, the number of uncertified teachers would also increase. At the same time, the KISZ-patronage, proclaimed for the improvement of teaching conditions, has disappeared recently: there have been hardly any steps taken since Zanka.

Cooperation may establish the unity that is really fundamental from the aspect of the young intelligentsia's future. At the same time, the recent past has proven the need for forums that present an opportunity for debates between groups of young intellectuals and for discussions of hypotheses. A good example is the conference of young philosophers and Marxist instructors in which 102 speeches were heard; or the theoretical-scientific meeting of young economists which also have an adequate framework for common views. The participants of the conference in Szodliget expressed their unanimous opinion that there is a need for more of this kind of initiative; and as a "by-product," certain flaws in the present training mechanism are disappearing.

Similarly, young artists also need independent forums, creative workshops and studios. Although certain branches of art do have these, industrial artists continue to lack them. And if the state organizations cannot meet these demands for any reason, the KISZ has the responsibility to take the initiative.

The conference was traditional and irregular--the self-contradictory difference also indicates progress. For the participants of such earlier conferences were mainly members of the council of young intellectuals of the KISZ's CC and of the working committees. But the terms of these officers had expired and new officers have not yet been selected and thus those people were able to take part in the debate who represented a broader stratum than before. The resolutions of the KISZ's 10th congress outlined the main tasks but the 5-year program can be good only if it is based on many opinions. The rules of democracy make this mandatory and this is the way in which the new form can become the framework for the new content matter.

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AIR FORCE PERSONNEL POLLED ON VIEWS ABOUT DEMOCRACY IN MILITARY SERVICE

Warsaw WOJSKO LUDOWE in Polish No 7, Jul 81 pp 53-58

[Article by Lt Col Eugeniusz Walczuk: "Democracy in the Group (Wing)"]

> [Text] Admittedly, in colloquial speech the words "democracy" and "group" are not usually used in the same direct juxtaposition as in the title of this article. Even today, when ostensibly impossible things are occurring, to me, an old soldier, it seems strange, really shocking. On the other hand, everything that has been happening in the army for many years, if judged by common sense, can be called nothing else but the process of combining democracy with the immutable principle of one-person command, the perfecting of interpersonal relations to the image and likeness of the noble ideals of socialist humanism. Is there democracy in the group? I asked this question, in late February, of airmen of various ranks and positions in a certain air force unit.

The takeoff shed, helicopters ready for night flights. Plenty of time before assembly, so the mechanics in their black, nylonlike coveralls have gone off for a cigarette. I walk up with my question: Is there democracy in the group? They look at each other, as if bewildered.

What, Exactly, Do You Mean?

--asks one of them. Well, is there democracy in the group? That depends on what you mean, mumbles one of them, probably the boldest one. I explain that what I want to know is do they feel deprived of all rights, as second-class citizens, can they freely express themselves, not just on personal matters, do they have any effect on that is going on around them. The same airman, the boldest one, nods his head that he understands, thinks for a while, and replies.

They do not feel like second-class citizens, absolutely not. He himself did not take part, because he has not been in service long enough, but he knows from his older buddies that here, in the group, elections to the Sejm and the people's councils take place, according to the universally binding regulations. Anyone can go with a problem wherever he wants. If it is a military matter, then through official

so that there should be order. And if it is a civilian matter, then directly, according to his own discretion. There is a daily newspaper. There is a radio and a television set in the dayroom. Available to all. Watching the news program is even compulsory. For a soldier should know what is going on in the country and in the world, shouldn't he? Treatment is also good, rather citizenlike. Yes, sometimes there is a harsh word, but not without reason. Usually this occurs in haste, for the good of the matter, so few people take it to heart.

Your name?

What for?

Good enough. You don't have to give your name.

Anyone can express himself, freely--interrupts a second man, taller, a little ungainly. But you must know the person, so it doesn't go any further.

What are you, crazy? -- He is nudged in the ribs by a stocky, fair-haired man.

Well, maybe my tongue slipped a little -- the big guy corrects himself. But no one has caught it for anything he said frankly. At the political instructions anyone can say what he wants. Depending on the subject. At the meetings, different ones, anyone can talk. About what hurts him, what bothers him. To say nothing about the political officers, to whom you can say everything very openly. They always listen, try to understand a person. What does he think about the strikes? That the first ones, those in August, were needed, very badly needed. The last ones, that's a bit too much of this good, or actually bad--the country is barely gasping. We must come to terms, otherwise we'll be down and squealing for a long time, all of us. He would be for order, if it became necessary to define his position--decidedly so. He is happy that General Jaruzelski came Prime Minister. Only that he should not neglect the army, for he took upon himself so many new, heavy duties.

He said that he could manage, remarked the stocky blonde one.

Anyone can talk. We'll see what happens.

Somewhat farther, next to the emergency truck, I meet PFC Stanislaw Skalski, engine mechanic and rigger, trained in the military. He smiles, shrugs his shoulders. Democracy, meaning full freedom of movement, speech, and doing anything one wants, right? Well, more or less. No, there is no such democracy in the group, unfortunately. And perhaps there cannot be, that is understandable. Here an order is an order. It may not be liked but it has to be obeyed. Most important of all is duty. Granted, in civilian life there are also duties. No one gets paid for nothing. But there, if you want to, although you shouldn't, you can ignore them, but here you have no right to do this, not the slightest. You have to sit in the barracks, and a young person would like to go out sometimes, have some fun. But here there must be combat readiness, without this there would be no army. But he does not feel lost, small, or insignificant.

He works with Staff Sgt Kazimierz Kubiak, on the staff. On a comradely basis, one might say. They help each other, frequently talk, and even argue. On various subjects, mainly political. And it is not such that the older sergeant talks and he only listens and agrees. Sure, he respects his rank and age but he does not always

agree with him, which he says outright. Sometimes there are some sharp clashes, but in the end the anger passes and everything returns to normal, with full understanding and respect for each other and their viewpoints.

At the meetings

One Can Speak

critically. But he does not always get an answer that is fully convincing or satisfying. During the political instructions the same things are said that were already thrashed out in the newspapers, on the radio and on television. This does not encourage discussion and becomes boring. One wants to go to the instructions when historical subjects are being taught, something more interesting can be learned, how it was in the past. We heard that at one time it was just the opposite, that the instructions dealing with current events, those that concern everyone, the old and the young, were more interesting. Times change. Tough.

One can appeal his case, to the squadron and higher. But it is his opinion that he will almost never get anywhere. And that is because each group holds to its own side. Privates, noncommissioned officers. Even the officers, while they are not offensive, treat everyone condescendingly. Do it and that's all, without talk. Can it be otherwise? It's hard to say. Perhaps it cannot be otherwise where the execution of a combat assignment, a safe takeoff and return to land, is concerned. But maybe it can and should be that ten people should not be put on a job that five people can do, for that makes it a fool's work and is nervewracking.

It is good that there is no yelling or vulgar words. There is no punishment, but neither is their any distinction. The offhand kind, not the very special once-or-twice-a-year kind of praise. So that a person would know specifically what the distinction is for. And a reward would be connected with what he is doing and what kind of grades he is getting during the theoretical lessons, during work on equipment, and also during takeoff and flights. There used to be elections for Soldier of the Month. Now no one is interested in them, not even the airmen. Because the furlough, which was given as a prize, cannot be used due to the heavy workload. The food is poor. Today there was mushroom soup from concentrate. A little of these hardly edible canned fish, portioned out exactly. True, the messhall isn't connected with the subject of our conversation, but it is hard to talk about democracy when the stomach is growling.

The takeoff control post begins to fill up. The first to arrive is the timekeeper, Cpl Wlodzimierz Wolski, with two night flight variants, for normal and difficult weather conditions. He nodded when he heard my question. Much has to be done for the cause, he said in general, so as to somehow weave into the thread of the conversation. We cannot make demands on others if we indulge ourselves. The one who wants to issue orders must be the best, at least no worse. And not, because I already have the rank and position I am above everyone else and can do what I like. This you get, and if you take something you have to realize what you are taking and what the duties are.

Democracy is a big word. I don't fully understand what you are asking about.

Does it mean that everyone is equal, everything is allowed? Well, in the army it cannot be like that. In the army there must be order, lower and higher, superior and subordinate. But one cannot dictate to another what he can or cannot say for then they would never come to an understanding. If something is bothering someone and he does not say, than it is his fault. At the political instructions, the same as at the meetings, one can speak out. Some speak out several times, yet they themselves are not always above reproach, as soldiers. In any case, he does not recognize this. First each one must do what is assigned to him, then he can go around giving out his opinions.

No, he is not a party member. He does not take part in the work of the Union of Socialist Polish Youth circle, although at one time he was chairman of the board, in Blaszki. That's a small town, near Kalisz. Here, in the air force, he didn't even report. And that is because he was very disenchanted. By the secretary of the party committee, who not only came to the meetings drunk, but made moralizing speeches. It was a disgrace to see and hear. In Blaszki, of course. Perhaps in the future, when he gets over this, then perhaps he will change. For the time being, however, he just looks. He has to digest certain things.

This is his second year of service but he has yet to see where someone in the unit has been mistreated. Well, perhaps with this correction, that in every squadron there is a nincompoop that the guys play jokes on, half for fun, half for real. But this is still within the bounds of decency, for one even gives a friend a hard time once in a while. Officers

Respect the One Who in in Good Standing

who fulfills his duties dependably. He, without bragging, is good, as a timekeeper. That is why his opinion is respected, he has no big problems in getting passes, or even a furlough.

In general matters also he is not ill at ease and speaks out loudly on what he thinks. I believe him, because he didn't even lower his voice when the staff duty officer, Major Janusz Szatkowski and the flight director, a lieutenant colonel, walked in. Renewal -- essential! But he always has doubts as to how it is to proceed. He observed and continues to carefully observe what is going on in the country. The previous prime minister, Pinkowski, promised a great deal, signed a lot. Maybe he didn't have enough time, in any case he didn't do much. People got raises, although not everyone earned his raise. Everyone has money but the stores are empty and there is nothing to buy. Changes in the government? Well, what can he say. He doesn't really know the people, and under these circumstances it is hard for him to express an opinion. He only knows that General Jaruzelski was known to be a good superior, a good commander. But who knows what kind of prime minister he will be.

Personally, he is in favor of democratic changes, listening to the workers, since he is one of them, despite his average education. Just as his hardworking father, a simple man. He does not imagine that the day will return when he will have to work in some factory. The political system is good; he, personally is satisfied with it. From the side of the slogans which are the guiding principles for everyone. It is worse from the standpoint of executing the slogans, which of course depends on the people. This can be revised according to how we want it. But if anyone were to want to destroy this system, then he would do everything necessary and everything that he was supposed to, so as not to allow this to happen. Cross his heart!

He dreams of being able to freely travel abroad, see the world. Some people go abroad and stay. Let them stay. At least they will see that in the West one has to work hard. No one gets paid for signing an attendance sheet. Returning to the subject, there continues to be a lack of honest information. Sure, it is said that here and there a strike has been announced. But seldom is there a word on why. He is not so dumb that he can be led around by the nose. He also knows how to calculate the losses that result from strikes. And what it comes down to is that there is not enough confidence in his intelligence. He is regarded as being unable to think in broader terms. What he is referring to, of course, are the mass media. For as far as the officers are concerned, they have no secrets and tell their subordinates everything that they know about the situation in the country or the region.

The flights began and it was necessary to interrupt the conversations which had no direct relation to them. I returned the next day, when it was more quiet in the unit. This time I gathered the opinions of the cadre, which is the core of every unit, not just an air force unit. I recorded what I heard as accurately as possible and will try to pass it on to the readers of our monthly.

Platoon Officer Cadet Wlodzimerz Sulewski, graduated last year from Gdansk University. He began his military service in the Political Officers Training Center, during the period of highest tension, so he can make comparisons. He cannot explain how this was possible, but only there, in the Center, did he become a little more familiar with the country's difficult situation. Because of the news which arrived continuously and was almost immediately transmitted downwards, to the students. Possibly this news was not always complete, but to a great degree it satisfied the hunger for information which until a couple days ago, in civilian life, he felt so acutely. Well, and also the talks, more penetrating and very frank, on all the subjects that interest us Poles. Only then and there did he discover, for himself, to hearten the soul, that everything is not collapsing, crashing into a heap.

He has been in the group since the first of the year, this is his second month. Yes, here one can see democracy, with the naked eye. Most of the airmen have a secondary education.

Partnership-type Relations Prevail

based more on conviction that on compulsion. On the whole, he was pleasantly surprised because before that he was totally convinced that in the army one is constantly being yelled out, is governed by sheer fright. He saw that it is not like that. This is a people's, citizens' army, with traditions. But he would not be honest if he were to say that everything is to his liking. In the group, although perhaps not as much as elsewhere, in civilian life, there seems to be a strange fear of stepping out of line, saying too much. Officially, because in a smaller group, on an informal basis, no one is especially reticent. This does not make a good impression. To say nothing of the fact that it is difficult to communicate in this way, or to discuss democracy.

Staff Sergeant Stanislaw Wajda. Not a party member. This is a change, because for 15 years he belonged to the party, attended meetings regularly. He took the floor, not always with the right results, so 2 years ago he turned in his card. No, he met with no unpleasantness. He continues to receive his quarterly and various

prizes. And that is because he does not spare himself, for the good of the service. He works well with the squadron commander, Lt Zbigniew Nawrocki, who frequently asks him for his opinion, consults with him on different matters. The fact that the squadron recently took first place in the group says something, doesn't it?

Democracy? He answers the question with a question. He thinks for a while, collects his thoughts. One can speak out and criticize--he finally defines his position. One can also go directly to the political officers on different matters. One can also go to the commander. He sees people every Monday, outside of official channels. No, he has never criticized his superior, for the simple reason that he has nothing against him. If he had, then he probably wouldn't be able to stand it for long and on some occasion, perhaps even face-to-face, he would tell him what is bothering him. If everyone does what he is supposed to, as well as he knows how, and even tries to help someone else, then criticism makes no real sense, from any broader point of view.

In a helicopter cockpit, two pilots are training. The younger warrant officer, Waldemar Sokolowski, replies. He did not join the party, although he was encouraged to do so quite insistently. In 1979, by the company commander, who passed out applications and said that if anyone doesn't fill one out, he may not be promoted. Because a pilot must be politically aware, skilled, and reliable. He asked for time to think it over, but in a short time the company commander changed and Lt Duraj did not come back to this subject. This makes him believe that this was only the idea of his predecessor, who was overly zealous.

There is democracy in the group and one can speak out freely. Perhaps it was like that before, but somehow there wasn't the convincing encouragement, a good example. It was believed that it is better not to take a chance, because if someone has it in for you... That is why only a few talked out loud about what they were thinking. Practice agreed with theory less and less. This pertained to everyone, party members and nonparty members. For this reason, perhaps, he doesn't feel that he is any better or any worse than those of his colleagues who joined the party--not always under pressure, it must also be said.

Warrant Officer Witold Marczak, nonparty member, also believes that there is democracy in the group, but it is limited, because the commander makes decisions, not the majority of the airmen. In his opinion, democracy is manifested in the fact that everyone can always express his opinion, with the full conviction that it will be carefully listened to and taken under consideration if it contains any real sense, some sound proposals. Freedom to express opinions and frankness--these are apparent at the political lessons. Although not to the same degree as in a smaller group, among colleagues. This makes him think a little, because of course he does know a case in which anyone has suffered on this account, but unfortunately that is how it is. From this standpoint recently something also has changed, for

The Tendency to Criticize is Growing

including criticism of the highest authorities, which is very heartening and speaks rather well for military democracy. And as far as this passing out of applications goes, that didn't happen when he was in school. Despite this, many of the cadet officers joined the party because this is mainly a question of convictions, a specific way of life.

The fire station--an inspection of the extinguishing equipment. Senior Warrant Officer Miroslaw Sopocko, president of the group's exemplary commanders club expresses the opinion that everything depends on how you look at the problem. On the one hand it may be said that there is no democracy in the group, for an order is compulsory and is the responsibity of the commander. But it may also be said that there is democracy in the group because various matters are examined collegially and personnel suggestions are heard. Everyone is able to speak out about everything and everybody, along with the unit commander. Some feel that it is no use doing so. It doesn't help much and one can do himself some harm. But he does not agree with this and does not remain silent if he sees that something is not right. He talks on the basis of facts and not guesswork. Straight from the heart, so as to help someone in something. On the whole he does not come out of this too badly, for he himself is in good standing, with his superiors, his colleagues and subordinates. Nor does he feel that he is a know-it-all.

Last week, for example, at the meeting an airman stood up and said that he has a grievance against him, for an injustice that he did to him. He could not recall and asked for details. The airman said that he had loosened his belt, for which he was terribly chewed out, which hurt him to the quick. And then he felt that the fire commander was picking on him for every little thing just because of this belt. He explained that he absolutely had no such intention and publicly apologized to him. For he came to the conclusion that this airman, the same as he, takes everything to heart that the commander says, that he takes his duties to heart, so he cannot be treated condescendingly.

The office of the assistant commander of the supply section, 2nd Lt Leszek Szatkowski, in his third year of service as an officer, reports. He is assigned as political instructor. It seems to him that he has known this group for a long time, from the time he was born. His father began his career here, established a family, served until retirement. He was brought up in a military center, in an atmosphere of never-ending conversations on what is going on in the group. Both good and bad. He recalls that somewhere back in the mid-1960's a great deal was said about some deals with selling hay, gathered from the apron of the airfield twice a year. There were whispers about escapades into the holiday resorts, where some drinking bouts took place with ladies, of whom there were plenty everywere. There were some hunting excursions, one of which ended very tragically with the death of a noncommissioned officer. The commander, the culprit of this accident, went to jail and never returned to the service. Eventually his buddies also were brought to account. A couple were transferred to other, less attractive posts, with the warning that they are not totally reliable in their assigned position. Others were transferred into the reserves. But the gang was broken up, ceased to exist.

He mentioned this to emphasize that one cannot talk about democracy if the same justice does not apply to everyone equally. Naturally, people are only people and make mistakes, sometimes they go too far. What is important is that this not be overlooked, and the reaction be immediate. Then everything makes some kind of sense or meaning. Simply put, one wants to live and work as best he can. The worst part is that people are still waiting too much and looking beyond themselves, for justice from the top, from the outside.

Exactly, agreed Capt Stanislaw Kusmierski, who came into the room at that moment. And of course experience teaches that democracy, including justice also, cannot be ordered or decreed. It must occur from deep conviction and reflect itself in the conduct of everyone, without exception. But some people demand democracy, and only for themselves. They immediately raise their voices if someone dares to have his own opinion, or slips up somewhere. That is how many unnecessary conflicts and clashes occur. There is no democracy at all when and where someone is accused of ill-will, being guided only by egoistic motives. Democracy is

Not Only Rights, But Also Duties

towards the wider community, towards all those with whom a person makes up this community. First a person must give of himself, so that there is something from which to take, even in the moral sense. Not everyone understands this.

Maybe he is wrong, but it seems to him that democracy in the group has something of a resolute, group nature. It is different among the officers, and different among the soldiers in the regular service. He also gets the impression that one cannot talk about the same treatment for the individual personnel corps, even in relation to the professional cadre. For example, there is a serious lack of housing in the group, just as in almost all of garrisoned Poland. There was a list which established the sequence of housing assignment, but it was turned upside down when a group of young pilots came into the group. And it turned out that a second lieutenant, who just completed school, found himself in fifth place, while a sergeant who had been thirteenth on the list landed so far down that there was no chance that he would get separate quarters in the near future. Sure, matters concerning pilots should be looked at first, because flight safety and expensive combat equipment is involved. But without exaggeration, for that creates feelings of injustice. It's the same with decorations, the distribution of prizes and bonuses, vacation cards, etc. Strangely enough, all higher decorations, bonuses and prizes are awarded to those with the higher positions, which does not go unnoticed and irritates and upsets people a little.

Major Augustyn Gaj, from the political section. There is democracy, sometimes too much. People have become bold. No longer is the commander's word holy. Now, more attention is paid to the sense of what he says. Not too long ago, when the commander saw people out of channels once a week, there were few who wanted to talk to him. Now there isn't enough time--some talks have to be put off to the next day. There are more courageous people at meetings also, they take the floor on general matters.

Yes, it can be said that in official relations there has been some lack of respect for authority. It is true that he has not yet seen a case where someone has criticized the commanders, but on the other hand people are quicker to present their own point of view, which is not always in accord with the official one. This increases the value of the discussion, encourages people to share their own thoughts. Naturally, the group does not exist in a vacuum. What goes on in the country, in the entire military, has a tremendous influence on it. And it must be admitted that a great deal of good is taking place, despite everything. For example, during the period since September, when the Central Committee's Sixth Plenum took place, the deeply entrenched bureaucracy was roundly criticized in a general and stormy discussion. The result was that by order of the chief of the General Staff, late in December, the number of informational, planning and reporting documents, mandatory at the company level, was reduced by 60. At the group level, the same thing happened.

Over 40 different competitions, which were not always worthwhile but took a great deal of time and money, took people away from more important tasks, were abolished. What this means is that words were not always thrown to the wind.

At the same time it became apparent how certain people became accustomed to thinking routinely, functioning according to guidelines, models and schedules prepared and handed down to them from above. Another typical example. The above-mentioned order bans the organization of playoffs for the district or military section table-tennis championships. Nevertheless, in the air groups these competitions took place. Teams had to be organized and dispatched. The competition for the Exemplary Culture Subsection was eliminated, but according the the political board's plan, it appears that the commander of the air troops intends to meet with the chairmen of the Union of Socialist Polish Youth from the subsections which achieved this distinction. Further, more than one director of a political training group complains that in the television or newspaper discussions on economic reform frequently conflicting points of view are presented, and so he doesn't know which position he is to take in his talks with the airmen. One has to think for himself, for which not everyone in the group is fully prepared.

The unit commander, a lieutenant colonel. Is there democracy in the group? Well, that's a very surprising question, but he will willingly reply. There is, but only for the wise, responsible people. That means for those who in their conduct are guided by some higher, common to all soldiers, goals. It is his belief that

There is No Democracy at All

for the sake of democracy itself. So that one can talk, do only what he wants to do. If this were so, it would be difficult to survive, because people would spend most of their energy on overcoming mutual resistance, arguing about who is right. To say nothing of coming to an agreement. First there must be something which would allow people to communicate, pool their thoughts and efforts for the common good. And only then can be talk about democracy, which is not and cannot be anything else than a means leading to these very goals. Sure, maybe this is a little complicated and perhaps not too clear, but he learned many times over that without theorizing there can be no practicing, no sensible solutions. Good, let's talk about how this looks close up, in the group.

Collegiality is not an abstract concept. Realistically speaking, there are no important official matters in the group which the commander takes care of himself, on his own. On the contrary, in solving the more complex problems of training, and the work and service of the airmen, he always considers the opinions and also the proposals of his closest co-workers and the party organization. Not in order to protect himself, no. In order not to make some horrible mistake or to do an injustice to someone because he doesn't know enough about the situation. In this way decisions are made which are complete and have been more thoroughly thought through. And the people who took part in these decisions feel a greater satisfaction and are personally responsible for seeing that they are implemented.

So it's like this: There is almost complete democracy in the group before a decision is made, but once it is made there is also unswerving and scrupulous compliance with

it. The decision must be executed no matter how difficult, although later complaints may be made of high-handed treatment. The good of the service, most important for all of us, comes into play, therefore there can be no consideration or allowances. Yes, opposition is allowed, but it must be based on reasons which perhaps had been overlooked, and in the opinion of the executor should be taken into consideration. In any case, a decision is binding until it is changed. Obviously, by the one who made it.

He personally does not like yes-men. If he comes across something like that he immediately asks what that person wants from him, what does he want him to do for him. Above all, he likes professionalism and an honest attitude toward work. And also good judgment and initiative. People who are not grumblers, who don't run to him with every little thing, but those who sit down and get to work. He is most annoyed by those who sit quietly, but when you ask them to do something they immediately pull out some regulation and say that it is impossible. Or they try to prove that someone is wrong and badly mistaken.

At the party meetings it's something else again. Here the commander participates on the same basis as all the other rank-and-file members. He can only try to persuade and make suggestions. No, never yet in his life has anyone criticized him at a meeting. First of all probably because he always tries to be in accordance with the regulations, the principles of ethics and the good customs of the cadre. And if it were to happen, then he would first carefully listen to what the person criticizing him had to say. Maybe he would get a little upset, but he does not imagine any kind of retaliation. Because why? Generally, although not always, his opinion prevails. One he proposed severe punishment for an officer who did all kinds of extra work but neglected his basic duties. The comrades, however, were of the opinion that a talk with the officer was sufficient, a public admonition. At first he wanted to appeal to a higher echelon, but after a while he came to the conclusion that the majority was right.

* * *

Although my intervieweees represent different professional groups and military positions, and look at the problem from another point of view, nevertheless a completely interesting picture of a developed and constantly-being-improved system of democracy in the group appears. Let us add that the picture is more or less in agreement with what is stipulated in the standardizing documents. Those such as the regulations, "Principles of Ethics" and "Customs...", which best express both the best traditions of the chivalrous and soldierly state and the contemporary experience of the cadre, gathered from time to time with the idea of updating them.

It is noteworthy that almost everyone realizes the limitations which result from the one-man principle of command, the immutability of the commander's order. And yet no one indicated by word or deed that he feels much worse off than in civilian life, before he went into the service. On the contrary, everyone appeared to emphasize that he can speak freely and also act in every socially important matter, that he can effectively pursue his own rights as an individual and a citizen. On one condition--that he regard the interests of the service above his own and is guided by higher motives. That he do well everything that is asked of him as bound by his oath.

Furthermore, the existing type of bond between those in service and the relationships with people not in service produces a satisfaction from work well-done, from the expressions of recognition from superiors and from the party organization. All of this taken together gives a person a sense of his own worth and social usefulness, an actual influence on everything that is going on around him. Under these conditions people feel free, for of course freedom is informed necessity, as Marx once said, despite the various restrictions which result from primary reasons, common to all us soldiers. An atmosphere of honest service prevails despite so many stormy and conflict-laden discussions which often take place, but never at the cost of work, the duty of maintaining soldierly alertness, and readiness to answer the call to arms. On this basis it may be said that the system of democracy which originated and developed in the fertile soil of the ideals of socialist humanism, as applied in the group, just as in the entire army, has completely passed inspection.

9295
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PROCEEDINGS OF PZPR IX CONGRESS REPORTED, ANALYZED

Budapest PARTELET in Hungarian No 9, Sep 81 pp 38-42

[Article by Istvan Pataki: "Special IX Congress of the United Workers' Party of Poland"]

[Text] Less than a half year has passed since the VIII Congress of the United Workers' Party of Poland when in wake of a renewed attempt to raise prices in July 1980 the socio-economic tensions which were accumulating for years exploded in a protest movement that spread to every class and stratum of society. One of the most important features to this day of the developing and constantly deepening crisis is that—in reaction to the repeated crises in the history of socialist Poland--confidence in the institutions of the existing socialist authority and in the leadership of the PZPR [United Workers' Party of Poland] has touched bottom. This is the key question even when following the unfolding of the crisis, the domestic anti-socialist forces and certain Western centers are trying to attain their political goals by exploiting the situation with well-coordinated activity, and even deepen it.

Following the coastal and Silesian agreements and the personal changes in the leading bodies of the PZPR, the idea was already formulated—without setting a date--at the 5 October 1980 session of the PZPR to call a Special IX Congress. It was expected that the deliberations would arrive at a program and at the same time restore a minimal level of social confidence necessary for the success of political action.

In the wake of the position taken by the session of the Central Committee, the preparatory working committee for the IX Congress began its work. Amid the fluctuating but lasting domestic tensions, however, the actual preparatory work began only at the end of April 1981, not fully 3 months before the date set for the calling of the Congress.

The special character of the Congress was indicated more than by the fact that it called for an assembly sooner than planned. Its special nature was determined above all by the continuingly serious general political and further deteriorating economic situation of the country, the tasks facing the Congress, and the magnitude of responsibility. To characterize the situation, emphasis on three areas of questions presents itself, touching on the problems only in passing:

--the political tensions exist in unchanged and in some places and at some times in acute form. The basic cause is to be found in the attitude of the extreme elements in the Solidarity trade union: an endeavor to fulfill the function of a political party, the parrying of co-responsibility for a solution of the tasks facing the country, continuing and unrestrained use of the means of strike pressure, and intensification of attacks against the Communist Party;

--an increase of economic problems which are embodied primarily in a decline in production, the slackening of cooperative relations among enterprises, and increasingly more serious supply problems. An indebtedness of about 25 billion dollars, the repayment doncitions, and the limits on the possibilities for new credits weighs as an oppressive burden on the economy;

--even the brief preparatory period for the Congress did not go smoothly. In addition to a general revival of party life and the search for possibilities of a way out, there were efforts which attacked the organizational structure of the Leninist party and the basic principles of democratic centralism on the pretext of necessary reforms and changes. In some places electoral rules were disregarded. The election as delegates of moderate party members who had filled no earlier party functions became a general demand. As a result, 91 percent of the Congressional delegates participated for the first time in the deliberations of the party's highest forum.

The Special IX Congress of the United Workers' Party of Poland was faced by the task of determining the main causes of the development of the crisis; indicating the party's line of direction; determining the program for the socialist unfolding of the crisis; and creating party unity.

It was after these preliminaries that the 1,964 delegates of the LEMP Special IX Congress began their work. The report presented by Stanislaw Kania, the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, stated that the exisiting socio-economic crisis could be ascribed to two basic groups of causes:

--a contradiction evolved between rapidly developing producer forces and an unchanging economic guidance. This was expressed in an immoderate indebtedness to the West, an exaggerated investment policy, a rigid planning and guidance system, and the slump in economic production;

--estrangement from the basic Leninist principles of party life and the lack of democratism in the leading organs and bodies of the state. This made possible the abuse of power, the suppression of rightful criticism, success centered propaganda, a burgeoning bureaucracy, and the quantitative outlook.

All these things basically violated the principles of social justice, moral norms, and led to increasing social dissatisfaction.

The Congress strengthened and developed a further political line of direction outlined at the sixth session of the PZPR Central Committee. The essence thereof was that "in the country we must restore the basic values of socialism, and in party life the ideological-political principles of Leninism, and we must direct attention to deep-going economic reforms, to the development of socialist democracy, to a respect for law, and to the solidifying of social discipline!" The way to do this is to settle social conflicts on the basis of agreements and consensus which will respect the socialist character of the state.

It was also clearly and uniformly worded that a sharp struggle was being conducted in Poland for the development of its socialist character and the defense of socialist achievements. In this struggle the relations of the party to the trade union movement, but primarily to Solidarity, is of vital importance. This depends primarily on whether Solidarity follows a constructive practice according to the provision of the basic rules or not. As is well known, the basic rules of the Solidarity trade union contains, among other things, the provision that the organization rests on the principles of socialism; it recognizes the leading role of the party in the state, it recognizes the country's international system of alliances, and does not wish to act as a political party. We must act in the interest of those party members who are at the same time members of Solidarity to see that the socialist profile of the organization is developed. The report as well as many speakers at the Congress expressed the need for resolute action against the internal forces of Polish reaction, because the so-called KOR (Social Self-Defense Committee) or groups of the Independent Confederation of Poland are more and more representing ideas that are alien to socialism and are taking action through hostile political efforts.

In the field of ideology, the deliberations emphasized the struggle against ideological extremes, on one hand against ideological compromise--with revisionism and right-wing opportunism--and on the other hand against the views of conservatism and dogmatism. This is only possible if the party's Marxist-Leninist character is strengthened.

The report of the Congress acknowledges the well-considered, realistic and responsible attitude of the Catholic Church, and as the goal for the state's Church Policy it indicated the expansion of the platform for cooperation between state and Church and for a reduction of the areas of conflict.

In every area of social and economic life, a many-sided demand for the strengthening of democracy profoundly pervaded the preparations for and the deliberations of the Special IX Congress. This became one of the main problems of the Congress both from the substantive and the formal point of view. The Congress regarded as necessary a broad-scale democratization of party life--organizational rules, modification of the electoral system, etc.--the cardinal point of which was the clear subordination of the executive organs to the elected bodies and to the representative organs. For a consistent, practical realization of this principle, they approved a mandate for the delegates which was valid to the next Congress. Many proposals were made for the development of socialist democracy, which were directed at broadening the activity of the councils and the various self-governing organs. At times, however, it was perceptible that a number of them did not regard democracy as only an indispensable means but as an absolute party goal.

The second main problem of the Congress was a resolute and irrevocable demarcation from the errors of the past, and their impassioned criticism. All this also necessarily meant the drawing of personal deductions: the committee led by Tadeus Grabski reported to the Congress at a closed session, and the delegates voted to exclude six members of the party's former leaders from the party. On the other hand, the delegates attributed exceptional importance to the election of the party's leading bodies. The form and mode of the elections as well as the results expressed the composition of the delegates, its demand for radical personal changes, and last but not least the line of direction for social compromise represented by Stanislaw

Kania. Thus an almost complete change was carried out in the leading bodies of the LEMP. It is not without interest to draw attention here to data regarding the new composition of the leading bodies: among the members of the LEMP Politburo and the secretariat, only four were previously members of the body; among the 200 members of the Central Committee, 80 are workers and 27 private farmers. Some of the members of the Central Committee are also members of the Solidarity trade union. It is indisputable that most of the new members of the Central Committee are inexperienced in the management of the country's affairs, but they do have a very essential characteristic: they have the confidence of the majority of their electors.

These factors express those elementary efforts which appeared at the Congress to create personal and institutional guarantees against repetition of the earlier crises.

The third major area of the deliberative work was made up of economic tasks and questions related to the economic stabilization program. In essence, these embrace three problem complexes:

1. ascertaining the declining trend in production, rational restraint on investments, and gradual restoration of the economic equilibrium.

2. defining of economic political priorities, improving the food situation, intensifying agricultural production, increasing raw material production, primarily coal, development of the energy basis, intensification of export capability, slowing down and then stopping the further deterioration of the country's financial equilibrium, and the fight against inflation.

3. introduction of broad-scale economic reform based on enterprise independence and the active participation of workers' self-governing organs.

Much was said about the need for structural changes, the manpower situation, prices and other important economic problems. They spoke of all three sectors of agriculture as a special task--creation of political and economic conditions assuring the dynamic development of private farms, state farms and producer cooperatives. And still, the main emphasis was on the introduction of economic reform, the basic political principle of which--according to the report--is the socialization of central planning, and a broader participation by workers and their organizations in determining national economic goals. The reforms must be harmoniously linked to social justice and to the content of socialist production relations.

Generally accepting the propositions in the report regarding economic stabilization, the speakers mentioned primarily the problems in their own area of work and urged the realization of the direct efforts of their party organizations.

The Congress affirmed the basic principles of Poland's firm alliance with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. Membership with the socialist countries, the development of friendship and alliance and multilateral cooperation with CEMA and the Warsaw Pact Organization are in the national interest of Poland; they are the sole guarantee of its independence, and it wishes to contribute to the realization of the coordinated foreign political steps of the socialist countries. The Polish People's Republic will do all it can to guard the peace and stop the arms race in the interest of deepening the policy of detente. The

Special Congress reaffirmed that Poland is prepared to host in Warsaw an international conference on military detente and on questions of European disarmament.

The work of the Congress was characterized throughout by great activity, impassioned discussions and comments, and heated debates. It is partly due to this that the deliberations were concluded almost a day and one-half later than originally planned.

The work of the Congress did not result--it could not--in spectacular turns during the course of the events. It did create, however, the conditions for party consolidation, and it set forth the basic line of socialist development--on the line of social agreement. The most essential question, however, remains to what extent the principles drafted at the Congress and set forth in the resolutions will be followed by deeds and consistent action. Therefore, we share fully with what Stanislav Kania said in his report: "Our credibility is not a question of good intent and proclamation, but above all of deeds, consistent action directed at strengthening our party, and that unwavering struggle which we conduct in our country against all dangers threatening the building of socialism."

At the invitation of the PZPR Central Committee the sister parties of the CEMA countries participated in the Special Congress, as well as the representatives of the Federation of Yugoslav Communists. In his remarks, Ferenc Havasi, the leader of the MSZMP delegation, affirmed the position of our party: "It is our conviction that the task of the Polish communists is to mark the road leading out of the crisis and call all followers of socialism into the struggle. In this they can count on the support of the sister socialist countries, among them ours, the Hungarian People's Republic. As up to now, they can in the future also build on the active solidarity of the Hungarian communists, the Hungarian workers."

At its second session, the PZPR Central Committee with its new composition resolutely stated that it will consistently take the field for the realization of the political line of action of the IX Congress and will fight against any distortion of it. It will not give way to the more and more political demands of certain circles in the Solidarity trade union, and it will not tolerate the demagogic exploitation of the working class.

The Congress has settled accounts with past errors, and now the opportunity exists for the leadership of the party and its members to turn with all their strength to the future and the development of socialism. The efforts of the party are meeting more and more with the wishes of the broad classes of Polish society and of soberly thinking people: let socialist Poland set out again on the path of progress.

In the short period of time that has passed since the Special IX Congress of the United Workers' Party of Poland, the extreme elements of Solidarity provoked tensions that threaten with increasingly new and greater dangers. This too indicates that our sister party must conduct a sharp class war over the long run, for the internal enemies of socialism, despite their slow moral isolation, have not yet by any means suffered a political defeat.

6691
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WESTERN PRESS NOTES 'WAVE OF REPRESSION' IN YUGOSLAVIA

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 16 Sep 81 p 3

[Article by correspondent "R. St.": "Wave of Repression in Yugoslavia--Belgrade on the Lee Side"]

[Text] Belgrade, 14 September--In Belgrade, openminded, comparatively liberal or at least marked by a breath of international generosity and superficiality, one does not notice much of the wave of repression which has gripped large parts of Yugoslavia, causing fear everywhere of a general hardening of the political climate. In the capital a pointed remark made at a late hour during a gathering of intellectuals is not immediately checked for possible treasonable content. The trial of the writer Djogo, charged with having composed poems containing malicious parables about a man whom, with a little imagination, one could recognize as Tito, at first became a farce, a joke for the intelligentsia, and for the time being the representatives of the state had to retreat for lack of evidence and adjourn the proceedings. A few days ago seven professors of the Praxis group who had been forced to retire in 1975 were assigned some academic work again.

Policy of the Carrot and the Stick in Kosovo

From other parts of the country, reports are coming in about political trials and quite harsh confrontations between state and church. The sentencing of Zagreb dissident Veselica was typical in two kinds of ways--for one thing because of the size of the punishment (11 years for merely having violated the law by expressing certain opinions) and for another because of the very doubtful judicial procedure, with some charges regarded as proven even though they had clearly turned out to be untenable during the questioning of witnesses.

But these questionable proceedings, too, pale before the almost daily reports of sentences in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo. In the wake of the unrest in early and late March, more than 200 Kosovo Albanians have been sentenced since late July for treasonable machinations--10 of them to the maximum sentence of 15 years set for such crimes as they were charged with.

In contrast with Zagreb, the trials in Pristina and other Kosovo towns are not attended by any foreign observers. For some time now, official reports about the trials have no longer been giving the age of those sentenced. Previous reports

had shown that quite a number of the disruptive elements were under 20 and definitely came not only from intellectual circles but from the working and peasant strata. While the signal for the unrest may have come from Pristina University, it found an echo in the other regions of the autonomous province and broader strata of the population. Belgrade's imputation that these people were guided from outside appears extremely doubtful. Rather, it is likely that accumulated discontent over social and economic conditions combined with a feeling of ethnic repression by the Serbs. It appears that Belgrade wants to cope with the problem through relentless repression, with the Province of Kosovo receiving generous economic aid at the same time. It remains to be seen whether this policy of the carrot and the stick will still work, whether it will be able to overcome the ethnically motivated resistance against the central government and particularly the presumed Serbian domination.

Pressure on the Church

In Croatia the dissident scene has been hit by the proceedings against partisan General Tudjman, the student Paraga, the writer Gotovac and the economist Veselica. Going hand in hand with extinguishing any spirit of contradiction (for even the authorities probably do not believe that the above-mentioned four are guilty of terrorist activities) are the polemics of ruling Zagreb communists, mostly of Serbian origin, against the Catholic Church. Central Committee Secretary Baltic has accused Zagreb Archbishop Kuharic of support for Hitler and Mussolini and of counterrevolutionary activities.

Slovene party Secretary Setinc was a little less harsh; according to him the Catholic Church wants to reestablish church predominance. However, he too hardly takes proper account of the facts. The Croatian clergy believes its task is to tend to the concerns of the people. It does not think that it has political responsibilities; rather it wants to take account of the complaints of the people. Thus, for instance, Archbishop Kuharic has spoken out for more humane prison conditions and for permitting prison priests.

As a result of Baltic's charges the climate between state and church in Croatia has deteriorated further. Part of the Croatian leadership evidently aims at massive intimidation of the church dignitaries. So far no concrete steps have been taken against disagreeable clerics; for the time being, the authorities are content with minor chicanery, such as not allowing bus transports for pilgrimages The echo this has met with among the predominantly Catholic population casts serious doubts on whether such measures are opportune and effective. The number of churchgoers has increased. And the heavy punishment of Marko Veselica has not primarily caused deterrence but a shaking of heads and bitterness.

A commentator of the widespread Zagreb church paper GLAS KONCILA fervently rejects the attempt being made at home and abroad to portray Yugoslavia as a china shop, and the Croatians as the bull groping around in it. It says the church continues to be ready for talks but not before defamatory utterances such as those about Archbishop Kuharic are done away with.

Fear of "Polish Conditions?"

In the past few months, official propaganda has been warning the Catholic Church time and again against assuming the kind of role in Yugoslavia which the Catholic Church has assumed in Poland. In fact it does not have the kind of legitimacy as a result of resistance against Hitler's Germany which the Polish church can claim. On the other hand, the communists themselves will have to wonder why the population has been truning increasingly toward the church of late.

8790
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WEST GERMAN COMMENT ON VESELICA TRIAL

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Sep 81 p 3

[Article by V.M.: "The Case of the Prosecution Is Based on the Statements of a Couple of Elderly Ladies--11 Years' Imprisonment for Croatian Intellectual Veselica"]

[Text] Belgrade, 10 September--The steep sentence in Zagreb of 11 years' imprisonment against Croatian intellectual and former professor of economics and member of the federal parliament Marko Veselica has caused surprise, and in numerous Yugoslav circles astonishment as well. Even more strongly than in earlier Zagreb trials of historian and former General Tudjman, the student Paraga and the writer Gotovac, this trial revealed the fact that the court adhered exclusively to the charges prepared by the police and did not take into consideration at all whatever the defense or the defendant stated in rebuttal. And yet, right after the conclusion of the preliminary investigation it was evident that the prosecution was basing itself in this trial on particularly vague and strange evidence.

Veselica was sentenced for three offenses--a crime against the social order and security of Yugoslavia, hostile propaganda "with assistance from abroad" and incitement of ethnic hatred, and participation in treasonable activity. Zagreb Deputy District Attorney Loncarevic, who drafted the charges and presented them, is a Serb, while Judge Hamilton, who accepted them without scrutiny in their entirety, is a Croat. Already after the so-called "Croatian events" of 1972, Veselica had been sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment. He served that sentence in full.

Half of the charges were based on the statements of a couple of elderly ladies, 69-year-old Mila Schram and 82-year-old Sonja Hegner. Both had been in prison because of political or allegedly economic offenses. At one time the word had been that the two women had wanted to retract their statements in toto or in part because they had made them under duress. In fact, at the trial Sonja Hegner altogether refused to recognize Veselica. Nevertheless, to the surprise of all those in the audience, the judge maintained at the end of the trial that her statement had carried great weight.

According to the indictment, Mila Schram had stated that in behalf of Veselica she had smuggled written material abroad to nationalist Croatian exile organizations and that this material presented conditions in Croatia in a "mendacious" manner. The defense was able to show indisputably that several points of the indictment

could not be right. It also seemed peculiar that the mentioned Mila Schram, of all things, was said to have worked for the foreign missionary operation of the Croatian Catholic Church in Bern. In the spring that institution had come under special government propaganda fire. After serving his first prison sentence, Veselica had joined the Catholic Church.

The second pillar of the indictment was an "interview" Veselica had given to an allegedly German journalist named Bornemann. Veselica admitted to have given the interview in writing, saying that it then suddenly appeared without his knowledge in nationalist exile publications. Strangely, nothing further was said at the trial about the identity of alleged journalist Bornemann. Veselica and his defense counsels were able to show that various official Yugoslav papers had written things that were not very different from what he had stated and that the interview as a whole represented a stand for Yugoslavia and against any kind of terrorism. Typical of the way the prosecution and the defendant talked past one another is the following detail: Veselica had stated that after the events in Croatia in 1971 altogether 32,000 persons had been "persecuted, discriminated against or subjected to chicanery." The prosecutor maintained that this was not so since in 1972 only 1,156 persons had been "charged." In doing so he obviously ignored all those who lost their jobs, were demoted or were otherwise disadvantaged. Veselica was defended by six attorneys--three Serbs, including Belgrade star attorney Popovic, and three Croats, including the father of the sentenced student Paraga. Particularly the Serbian attorneys made it a point that there could be no question of anti-Serbian points of view in Veselica's remarks.

In contrast with the Croatian papers, which came up only with succinct reports of the trial, the Belgrade POLITIKA devoted a lot of space to the proceedings. It was therefore interesting to see the biggest Serbian paper obviously going to the limit of what it could do in its reports to make known its doubts in the power of persuasion of the indictment. POLITIKA appeared to have particularly little use for the star witnesses of the prosecution.

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WESTERN COMMENT ON VERDICT IN VESELICA TRIAL

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 11 Sep 81 p 2

[Article by "cvk.": "Trials Against Intellectuals in Croatia--Draconian Sentence in Proceedings Against Veselica"]

[Text] Zagreb, 9 September--The latest in a series of political trials against intellectuals in Croatia ended on Wednesday [9 September] with an unexpectedly severe sentence--11 years' penitentiary for 55-year-old Marko Veselica. The reasons given for the sentence repeat the indictment almost verbatim. By applying paragraphs 133, 134 and 131 of the Yugoslav Penal Code, Veselica was sentenced for hostile activity against state and people, spreading ethnic hatred between the peoples and ethnic entities of Yugoslavia and cooperating with extremist emigre circles with a view to preparing "hostile actions."

Main Points of Indictment

Key passages of the indictment are excerpts from an interview Marko Veselica had given to an FRG journalist, Hans Joachim Bornemann, in the summer of 1980. The journalist had stated that he was on the staff of DER SPIEGEL, but the interview appeared not in that journal but in several publications of the Croatian emigre press. In the passages considered incriminating, Marko Veselica had expounded in great detail his personal views about the domestic political situation in Yugoslavia, stressing particularly the problems of Croatia and discussing subjects regarded as taboo.

The six attorneys of the defendant--three Croats and three Serbs from Belgrade--concluded in their summing up that the material on which the indictment was based was wholly inadequate for a verdict against Veselica. Nor were the witnesses for the prosecution able to support the claims of the public prosecutor. As always in such political trials, no witnesses for the defense were admitted. The main witness even retracted her statement given in the preliminary investigation that she had known the defendant. She told the court in detail what statements and methods the state police had used to force her to make that statement. Nevertheless, Judge Hamilton in his concluding statement described that witness as an important link in the chain of evidence of the relations which the defendant had entertained with extremist emigre groups. The court did not take cognizance of the argument of the defense that the full text of the interview

showed that Veselica's very critical remarks did not have a "hostile" tone and that he disassociated himself from the use of violence in general and from the methods of extremist emigres in particular.

Increasing Harshness of Croatian Authorities

The spectators in the large hall of the Zagreb District Court were surprised about the heavy sentence. Observers had not expected such a verdict. The trial confirmed the increasing one-sidedness of the authorities, particularly in Croatia, in classifying critical remarks arbitrarily as "hostile and counterrevolutionary." Once again the proceedings showed that the courts in such trials act in accordance with strict instructions to the effect that the verdict must be decided in advance. The circles issuing those instructions also quite clearly do not appreciate the fact that Yugoslavia is thus suffering serious damage as a "democratic" example of a state under communist rule. The statement by the defense, that--apart from Veselica's being innocent of the charges against him--the indictment violated the international agreements about the free exchange of information and the safeguarding of human rights of which Yugoslavia was a signatory, likewise fell on deaf ears.

A group of Swiss parliamentarians in this connection, on behalf of the International Helsinki Association, sent a letter to Dragutin Hamilton, the presiding judge in Zagreb. Already in 1972, in the course of purges ordered by Tito in order to cope with the "euphoristic mass movement" in Croatia in 1970-1971 (as it was called officially), Veselica was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment. Until 1971 he had occupied leading posts in the Croatian party and had worked as lecturer in economics at Zagreb University.

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WEST GERMAN COMMENT ON NATIONALITY POLICY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Sep 81 p 12

[Article by Viktor Meier: "Yugoslavia Is Becoming More Serbian--Imbalance in Nationality Policy"]

[Text] Belgrade, September 1981--There are two great burdens oppressing socialist Yugoslavia at present--economic difficulties and reawakened ethnic questions. The regime is reacting in different ways to these groups of questions: It is at a loss as far as the economy is concerned, and vis-a-vis the ethnic movements it is exercising repression.

The papers have stopped reporting the age of Albanians sentenced in Kosovo. (Their number has exceeded 250.) Otherwise the world public would learn that 15- and 16-year-old high school students have been sent to prison for years just because they dubbed some wall or other with the slogan "Kosovo--Republic." The 11-year prison sentence against Croatian intellectual Veselica has had a shock effect, having made numerous circles, including foreign ones, aware of the fact that there is such a thing as a "Croation question." Equally shocking has been the unbridled language against the Catholic Church.

Though not in the dailies, sensational stories about the situation in Kosovo and about methods of so-called "differentiation" are appearing in magazines such as START or REPORTER. Young Albanians tell about having been arrested, deprived of their jobs or excluded from studying without reason and often as a result of denunciation. Expulsion from the so-called "Socialist League," a popular front organization to which almost everyone belongs, whether he wants to or not, is coming to be used as a means of defamation, it thus becoming a matter of record who the "enemies" are. One is being reminded of conditions in Czechoslovakia in 1969. Many college and high school students have been excluded from studying. Everyone has to show certification from their local political authority before he can register this fall.

On the other hand, one can see in the same magazines and on television glorifying pictures of special police contingents composed of units from all the republics being employed in addition to the reinforcements called in from Serbia. Partly there is also praise for the action of the army, which is continuing to be charged with protecting assets and special surveillance of the border areas.

Nervousness vis-a-vis the Catholic Church, viewed ever more clearly by the regime as the carrier of Croation national consciousness, finds expression in the behavior of the communist authorities concerning the so-called miracle of Medjugorje near Citluk in Herzegovina. Obviously alarmed by the increasingly large number of persons making a pilgrimage to that place, where allegedly the Holy Virgin has been appearing to a number of children since spring, the authorities arrested the two local pastors--Franciscans--put them in prison for 60 days, confiscated the money found in the parsonage, consisting mostly of alms but also of regular church funds, and prohibited anyone from setting foot on the hill where the apparition reportedly first occurred. In proceeding this way, however, the authorities--if anything--played into the hands of the church. The latter now states that, considering all this nervousness, "something supernatural" must have happened in Citluk; the only thing that remained to be established was whether it was part of the supernatural on which the church drew all the time or something beyond that.

The unbridled attacks by Baltic and other officials against Zagreb Archbishop Kuharic have prompted the church paper GLAS KONCILA to answer a question which evidently has been asked often among Croation Catholics--why the archbishop was not defending himself. The paper writes that the archbishop cannot assume the role of defendant. If he were to go in for polemics on that basis, people might perhaps reach the conclusion that where there was smoke there was fire, or that the Croatian Catholic Church was behaving like "an irresponsible bull in the Yugoslav china shop." This was the last thing the church wanted; it was just as interested in stability and security as most other Yugoslav citizens.

Not all communist politicians in Yugoslavia are pleased at this escalation. Some among them even think, unofficially, that the stand taken against the memory of former Zagreb Archbishop Stepinac by the Croation head of government, Blazevic, was unnecessary and are also dissociating themselves from the rhetoric of a Baltic. The opening of ever new "fronts" is hardly sound politics, particularly in connection with the economic problems, they say. (Perhaps soon there will be another such front against the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina once the new census results are announced.) Meanwhile one gets the impression at the moment that the radical politicans are having a pretty free hand. This leads many Yugoslavs to wonder just who is ruling the country.

In this context one is struck by a trend which is causing concern in some republics. It is the ever-increasing weight of Serbian interests, Serbian points of view and also Serbian politicians in the orientation of the state as a whole.

As the Serbian head of government, Ivan Stambolic, said again only recently, the Serbian Republic wants to take Kosovo under its wing again to a greater extent and form stronger economic ties with it. Before the unrest Kosovo, as an autonomous region within Serbia, virtually had acted like a republic in its own right. The sentences against the Croatian intellectuals and the campaign against the Catholic Church likewise show a one-sided tendency, for in Belgrade it is hardly likely that someone would be sentenced if, from the Serbian point of view, he were to advocate theses like those of a Tudjman or Veselica. One gets the impression that the regime either is afraid of a confrontation with Serbian nationalism--in other words, with by far the largest ethnic entity--or in fact is making it its own.

The latter would represent a development in Yugoslavia continuing in principle the structures of prewar times. The main Serbian paper, POLITIKA, otherwise along with the journal NIN--published by the same outfit--an advocate of a freer dialogue, recently published a favorable political article about a former Serbian Chetnik leader who later went over to the side of the partisans. By doing so, it incurred the criticism of influential former partisan leaders. In a further piece of the same kind, it gave the onetime leader of the Slovene administration under the German occupation, and leader of the anticommunist fighting associations, General Rupnik an opportunity posthumously to clear himself, as it were. (Rupnik was executed after the war.) It reports him as describing how --vis-a-vis the German organs of occupation--he acted, not without success, in behalf of the right of the Slovenes for a national life of their own. The Serbs and the Slovenes were the so-called supportive nationalities of the prewar Yugoslav state. Certainly it is time to look at certain events in Yugoslavia during the war in a more differentiated way than has been done heretofore. The question is only why the same POLITIKA (and NIN as well) cannot make up its mind, for example, to cast a similarly objective light on the role of Croatian Archbishop Stepinac during that period, and why so far only a Croatian official--Suvar--has shown in Yugoslavia in public a certain understanding for the historical motivation of the Albanian revolt in Kosovo.

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CATHOLIC PRESS DISCUSSES ATTACKS ON CHURCH

Zagreb GLAS KONCILA in Serbo-Croatian 30 Aug 81 p 2

[Editorial: "Why Doesn't the Archbishop Defend Himself?"]

[Text] Charges of antigovernmental activity on the part of the church, that is, on the part of certain church leaders and officials, has not died out in the newspapers and on various tribunes of sociopolitical organizations and government bodies. Month after month, week after week, it is only the emphasis and the immediate goal of such charges which change. Until recently the principal target of such attacks was the archbishop of Zagreb and his group of collaborators in the Cathedral. And then the accusations were addressed to several distinguished names in our episcopate. And finally--these past few days, the charges have concentrated on Medjugorje and Mostar, on the heads of the church there, because of gatherings of believers which were prompted by rumors about appearances of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Bijakovici and Medjugorje, but which in their actual content--as far as we have been able to determine--were confined to prayer and exclusively concerned with church affairs. The content and vocabulary of the public charges against churchmen are such that many people wonder that they could be proclaimed enemies of the state and the system in this way and yet not have gone to prison or to trial. Rumors are reaching us with increasing frequency from the public that we ought to react and defend ourselves. There was a particular expectation that the archbishop of Zagreb, chairman of the Conference of Yugoslav Bishops, would react publicly to the relevant sections of the speech by Milutin Baltic, secretary of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, delivered at a rally in Banski Grabovac on the Day of the Uprising, 27 July of this year. That is, Baltic--fully aware of the responsibility of his sociopolitical position--declared that "Kuharic and certain other gentlemen in the Zagreb Cathedral, with abundant help from certain lawyers and mouthpieces, have gathered all their strength in order to revive to some extent and resuscitate those exhausted and ruined old nags of the counterrevolution" and to act against the socialist community, to sow ethnic enmity, that they even glorified Hitler and Mussolini, and so on. The public has therefore been wondering why the archbishop has not so far responded to those charges. But they should first ask themselves why Baltic and others like him are acting in this way? After all, it is obvious to anyone familiar with the situation and events in our church that these charges are unfounded, that the accusers have no occasion to make them. But where there is no occasion,

there must nevertheless be a reason, and intention. Where does this lead? Who desires it? What does it serve?

Engrossed with these questions the people of the church referred to have mainly not been taking up the debate persistently being thrust upon them by various newsmen and other public figures, they are not taking up the role of accused persons who have to defend themselves. After all, it is more than obvious that someone desires precisely that: To impose on our community life as vociferous and fierce a conflict as possible with the Catholic Church which lives here, that is, with the Church of the Croats. That is why the reactions of the church today have been limited to the clear adoption of certain positions which are altogether firm concerning certain events and persons, but it deliberately has not wished to go further. After all, as soon as the wished-for and imposed debate flares up, as soon as that provoked conflict carries some distance, it seems that the instigators will have achieved what they wanted. It seems, that is, that someone is counting on the "logic" of public harangues in which the exact information about the facts is usually not important, but the public reacts in accordance with the adage: "Where there is smoke, there is fire." Thus the desired impression would be established in world public opinion that it is specifically the Catholic Croats who are behaving irresponsibly in this state, that they are threatening domestic and external stability, the agreed equilibrium, that--as one of our bishops recently noted--they are behaving like an "elephant in a glass shop." But, that bishop said, this simply is not the truth. Neither the reality is made as of glass, nor are the Catholic Croats like a dangerous and irresponsible elephant. Can it be that the purpose of the rumor created and spread in this way was to justify certain actions? Or was it to drown out certain rumors? Or to bypass certain more logical solutions? But to whose benefit? There is no doubt that it cannot be a question here of benefit to the common life of nationalities within Yugoslavia on an equal footing.

We can bear witness that those responsible in the church have always been ready for any dialogue guaranteed to be equal and open concerning all issues which impose themselves by their importance with anyone who also wants to take a responsible approach to those issues. But for such a dialogue to be objectively possible, there has to be an end to harangues, to accusations, to the labeling of churchpeople as enemies of the state and the people. After all, there is no dialogue with those who have been discredited. And any attempt to bypass those who have been "disqualified" on the side of the church and find other responsible interlocutors has already proven itself to be futile and will prove to be futile every time. In the end the real disposition of the multitude of believers and the age-old methods of church diplomacy should be understood.

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MOSTAR BISHOP'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT KRAIGHER

Zagreb GLAS KONCILA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Sep 81 p 9

[Open letter by Pavao Zanic, bishop of Mostar, to Sergej Kraigher, president of the State Presidency, on 1 September 1981]

> [Text] Monseignor Pavao Zanic, bishop of Mostar, addressed a letter to Sergej Kraigher, president of the State Presidency, on 1 September of this year in which he protests the untruthful assertions and charges which have been disseminated in connection with the events in Medjugorje. We are printing the letter here in its entirety.

Honorable Mr President!

In the daily newspapers and over the radio and television it has been reported in various ways that on 17 August 1981 an expanded meeting was held in Citluk of the Citluk Opstina Conference of the SAWP, which debated the events in the parish Medjugorje.

The reports also alleged the following:

"It was emphasized that the people should be told still more clearly that the aspirations and plans of the priest Jozo Zovko of Medjugorje, his colleague Ferdo Vlasic, Bishop Zanic of Mostar and other extremists are the same as what the Ustasha terrorist organization is planning and dreaming up for us. The cleronationalists have set themselves against the achievements of the revolution, against the constitutional system, against socialist self-management, and that is essentially the most brutal use of people's religious sentiments."

This was carried on the news by Radio-TV Sarajevo on 17 August 1981 and VECERNJI LIST on 18 August 1981.

I consider it my duty and right to indignantly protest completely unfounded and untruthful insinuations of this kind.

As a Catholic bishop and responsible priest of the Mostar Episcopate I reject on my own behalf and that of the priests mentioned, who are my subordinates, these

irresponsible slanders and attacks whose bad taste contributes nothing whatsoever to a sober examination of the events in the parish of Medjugorje.

Basic civil and human rights are violated by insulting acts like these.

I call upon you to take this protest of mine under consideration and as the most responsible person in the SFRY to take the most vigorous steps against irresponsible attacks of this kind.

Please accept expressions of my respect.

Pavao Zanic (signed)
Bishop

As stated in the letter itself, Bishop Zanic also sent this protest to the highest federal and republic government authorities, the Mostar and Citluk Opstina assemblies, the editors of all journals carrying news on the events in Medjugorje, all Catholic newspapers and journals in the SFRY, the Holy See, the presidency of the Conference of Yugoslav Bishops in Zagreb, all bishops in the SFRY and to the clergy and church members in his own episcopate.

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SITUATION, ARRESTS IN MEDJUGORJE RELATED

Zagreb GLAS KONCILA in Serbo-Croatian 30 Aug 81 p 2

[Text] According to the most recent reports from Hercegovina worshippers of Mary are continuing to gather every day in Medjugorje. There is regularly as large a crowd around the church as in the church. Numerous priests are listening to the confessions of the multitude of pilgrims, and among the penitents there are more and more of those who have not confessed for many years. All of these gatherings of believers are occurring in a completely orderly, peaceful and level-headed way. The number of pilgrims was particularly large on the Feast of the Assumption. Church officials are doing only what is customary at religious gatherings: They celebrate Communion with the people, they announce and interpret God's word and administer the sacraments. The children who say that the Virgin appeared to them are still reporting such encounters. On the basis of what they have said the responsible people in the church have so far found no reasons to prevent the gatherings, since the motives and messages are not contrary to the faith, to morality nor to church discipline. The believers speak in greater or larger number about seeing lights and certain other visual effects--which is probably one of the well-known accompanying phenomena of such gatherings and which in itself is a topic to be studied by the appropriate sciences. Rumors are also spreading about sudden healings which are considered miraculous, but none of these cases has yet been subjected to the study of medical or church experts, nor can anything more definite be said about this at present.

Along with this atmosphere of prayer and the sacraments and simple messages of love, peace and faith--all of which together has a constructive effect--there have also been certain adverse phenomena in recent weeks, according to what has been written in the public press and speeches at certain sociopolitical meetings. There is mention of certain political slogans which have been found written on the rock and among numerous prayers of the pious at the place of the first encounters. There is also the mention of singing certain songs which are judged to be political. It is self-evident that the church leadership cannot consider itself responsible for such alleged occurrences, just as the administration of a shrine, say, is not responsible for cases of pickpocketing or similar offenses around the shrine, but leaves this to the regular concern of those who maintain peace and order. If the law enforcement agency conducted an effective investigation, it would be fully established that any possible offenders are not churchpeople, but those who for whatever reason wanted to abuse and compromise this gathering of the pious.

It has also been announced in the daily press that the Franciscan Ferdo Vlasic, editor in chief of NASA OGNJISTA, of Duvno, has been sentenced by the misdemeanor judge to 60 years in prison and has already been bound over to serve his sentence. The reason given for his conviction was his resistance to police officers near the place of these gatherings. We have also learned that officers of the secretariat for internal affairs in Mostar surrounded the Franciscan house and parish church in Medjugorje at about 0800 hours on 17 August and conducted a very detailed search of all persons and all the rooms. The detailed search of the person of the nuns was conducted by a special woman official. The procedure was completed at about 1745 hours. The law enforcement officers took from the parish house money which they found there, and according to church information it involves a large sum of money which the parishioners pay for holy masses or as a mere gift to the church.

The Medjugorje parish priest, Father Jozo Zovko, was arrested and taken into custody at that time. According to the news which we had at the time when this issue of GLAS KONCILA goes to press, he is in jail in Mostar. We have been unable to learn the reasons for his arrest, that is, the grounds on which Zovko might have been charged. On the basis of what has been written in the newspapers one might assume that they have imputed to him a portion of the sermon in which, speaking the most ordinary biblical language about sin as enslavement and redemption as liberation, he said, among other things: "Jesus said: the Lord has sent me to deliver from the prisons the captives, the prisoners, the convicts, to set them free ... so did he not come to liberate me, since I am a captive, you, who are a prisoner, since you have been enslaved for 40 years; so that this evening or tomorrow you can kneel down before him and say: remove the chains, untie the knots, loose the links which confine my life, since I have been fettered, by evil sin." (Quoted from SVIJET, published in Sarajevo on 17 August of this year.) Those familiar with the Bible will recognize the literal words of the Gospel applied to a particular penitential religious service, while certain newsmen who have been writing about this express the opinion that Zovko was alluding to the 40th anniversary of the commencement of the revolution and struggle against the occupiers. However, the reference was obviously to the people who were confessing during those days in Medjugorje and who had not been seen for some 40 years or more.

We hope that before the next issue we will have more definite information about this case and that the events and words which are spoken will be examined in the entirety of the church and social context--that we will be able to report a favorable outcome.

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WESTERN COMMENT ON IVAN SUPEK'S POLITICAL MEMOIRS

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 22 Aug 81 p 5

[Article by Fran Rudin: "Heretics on the Left--Confessions of a Croatian Dissident"]

[Text] Is it really true that in a communist-ruled country such as Yugoslavia an independent road toward communism means less doctrine and at the same time more freedom both for the individual citizen and for the nationalities? Can the "Yugoslav model" convince its opponents by means of rational arguments instead of ideological prescriptions? Are Yugoslave politicians to judge works of art and scientific findings? Has Yugoslavia found the just solution to the national questions? Does this state need a nuclear bomb? These and similar questions occupy Prof Ivan Supek--a 66-year-old theoretical physicist, former communist, and member of the Department of Science and Mathematics at the University of Zagreb in Croatia--whose book "Krivovjernik na ljevici--politicka sjecanja & humanisticka poruka" [Heretics on the Left--Political Reminiscences and Humanistic Message] was published in England (British-Croatian Review Publications, Bristol, 1980).

This "personal statement" is the "humanistic creed" of a scientist, philosopher and steadfast humanist, whose books were not only criticized--for their lack of Marxist conception and disregard for dialectical materialism ("Theoretical Physics and the Structure of Matter")--but also removed from the bookstores and burned ("Exist All the Same"). Whereas Pavle Savic built--in Vinca near Belgrade--a nuclear research institute, intending--in accordance with his magic formula "socialism + nuclear energy = communism"--to produce a nuclear bomb, Supek in 1950 founded in Zagreb the "Rudov Boskovic Institute", whose research work he oriented entirely toward the basic problems of physics, chemistry, biology and electronics. Eight years later, the institute comprised approximately 100 scientists trained in Western Europe and the United States. In 1958, Alexandar Rankovic--at that time second in command in Yugoslavia--ousted Supek on account of what he claimed was an insufficient ideological orientation of the institute and replaced him by two Serbs; Supek thereupon devoted himself entirely to literature and philosophy. Through the medium of novels and plays, he fought nuclear energy: "Trial of the Century"; "Atop the Nuclear Volcanos"; "Superbomb and Crisis of Conscience." Through his book "Heretics on the Left," Supek wanted to show that he was concerned not only with science, but with truth and justice, which again and again had been denied his people on account of historical misunderstandings.

Zagreb Revisionism 1939-1940

At the age of 12, Supek saw Stjepan Radic, the leader of the Croatian Peasants' Party (KBP), and the crowd enthusiastically acclaiming him; a year later, he witnessed Radic's 2-month agony--after the shots fired in the Belgrade Parliament on June 20 1928--and the biggest funeral ever given a Croatian. A short time later, he witnessed the joint proclamations of the Communists and rightist extremists calling for an uprising against Serbian hegemony and the proclamations of the Democrats urging establishment of democratic liberties and of equal rights for the nationalities. The Serbs' predominance in the army and in the police and the corruption and persecutions early on brought to the fore the "Croatian question," and as early as 1932 Supek joined the Communists, for whom the "obedient and reliable boy" performed courier services. Subsequently, in his capacity as editor of the NEUER STUDENT, he gained the trust of the party leaders. Since at this time the party was opposed to terrorism and subversive acts, there was "no conflict with a conscience raised in the spirit of Christian pacifism."

In the beginning, the Comintern regarded the opposition of the Croatian Communists as a revolutionary force and even though they were strongly drawn--for both tactical and patriotic reasons--to bourgeois-national liberation movements, it sided with them. Since 1934, the Comintern and its leader, Stalin, had been calling for the establishment of communist parties in Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia "so as to wrest from the bourgeoisie the banner of the struggle for national rights." At the Comintern Congress of 1935, Georgi Dimitroff stated it would be good policy for the Communists to join a popular front and mobilize against Fascism. Thus the Croatian Communists made common cause with the left wing of the Croatian Peasants' Party.

Since at that time the Communist Party was barred from Yugoslavia's political arena, it had to link up to a legal party to be able to participate in the elections. Thus in 1938 the Croatian Communists--repeating their maneuver of 1935, but this time without the consent of the Politburo--entered the elections along with the entire opposition rallied around the Peasants' Party, which then was victorious. Although this opposition did not have a specific platform--aside from being the political body legally representing the Croatian people against the monarchy--the move was condemned by the majority of the Serbian Communists. The criticism and accusations from Belgrade were extended to the Croatian leftist intelligentsia that had rallied around the writer Miroslav Krleza and his monthly SIEGEL (1939-1940)--a group that had rejected the political tutelage and the ideology of the Comintern with its insistence on socialist realism and on the dialectical foundation of all knowledge and all activity in favor of independence, personal freedom and truth. Taking advantage of the Comintern's change of course, the Politburo of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia established a monthly of its own--LITERARY JOURNALS--and laid down clear directives for art. The Zagreb Communists were accused of "liberal deviation," "idle liberalism" and "revisionism, and the group of educated individuals (Supek, Krleza and others)--considered to be the most heretical element in the communist movement--was expelled from the party.

The movement Carillo and Berlinguer later called Eurocommunism originated at that time from Zagreb's "Corso" inn. The Croatian Communists had been the first to declare their willingness to collaborate with the popular front without insisting on playing a leading role. The concrete dilemma and the deep disillusionment over

Stalin's policy were reflected in three new principles: Universality, freedom and tolerance. The consequences were not long in coming: The new Politburo of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia--elected in Zagreb in 1940--comprised four Serbs, two Slovenes and one Montenegrin, but not a singly Croatian. Tito, Djilas, Kardelj, Koca Popovic and others advocated Bolshevization of the party and "democratic centralism."

Croatia's Contribution to Victory

After Yugoslavia had been defeated by Hitler, many parts of the country were given over to Hitler's allies. The Communists were able to take advantage of the individual nationalities' restlessness that was accumulating as a result of the occupation: In consequence of a Serbian uprising in 1941, an area around the city of Uzice was liberated and proclaimed the Red Uzice Republic; a short time later, however, it disappeared again and the CPY [Communist Party of Yugoslavia] Politburo no longer had any strongpoint in the east of the country. Tito informed the CPC [Communist Party of Croatia] Central Committee that the situation in Serbia (and Montenegro) was very grave and that he was pinning his hopes on the struggle in Croatia.

Although he was deeply disappointed on account of his expulsion from the party, Supek joined the resistance movement organized on the left wing of the Croatian Peasants' Party by Andrija Hebrang, the CPC secretary, and Bozidar Magovac. Robbed of most of their islands and of Istria and the coastal region and engaged in a covert revolt against the Unitarists aspiring to establish a Great Serbia, the Croatian people were easily induced to rise up. The joint proclamations issued by the Croatian Communists and Democrats, which promised a "new Croatia in a new Yugoslavia," attracted many people; consequently, the ranks of the partisans swelled and the Croatian leadership had at its disposal over 20 divisions, i.e. two-thirds of all partisans in Yugoslavia. While the red radicals in the CPY Politburo were placing their hopes on the Red Army, hiding out--after the demise of the "Red Republic" of Uzice--in the Croatian mountains, the Croatians had gained control over a large area extending from the Drava River to the Adriatic. Thus they were able to convene in this area a number of congresses, among which Supek singles out the "Congress of Croatia's Cultural Activists," at which he voiced--14 months before Hiroshima--his fear of the atomic bomb and called for disarmament; again, this resulted in his being accused of deviation from Marxism-Leninism.

When the British military mission learned that Serbia had been pacified under the dual government of Germans and Chetniks, Churchill in 1944 dissolved the Royal Government in its London exile; he felt confirmed in this decision by the fact that Draza Mihajlovic, the Royal Government's minister of defense, was accused of having collaborated with the Fascists. Churchill appointed Dr Ivan Subasic, the head of the Croatian Government who was likewise exiled in London, Premier of Yugoslavia. The reaction on the part of Serbia notwithstanding, Churchill dispatched Subasic to Yugoslavia to establish contact with Tito and to lay the foundations for the new Yugoslavia. As for a model, Churchill and Roosevelt insisted on a multiparty system based on the respective degree of involvement in the struggle. Even though Stalin, too, supported this--albeit only out of consideration for the United States and Great Britain--and although this system had been anticipated during the war by some members of the CPY Politburo, the Politburo in November 1945 disbanded all parties, eliminated the noncommunist comrades-in-arms and a political tradition, and introduced the single-party system.

Conflict With Djilas

Since the 1950's, Milovan Djilas has been known in the world as the Yugoslav dissident. Supek quotes extensively from the two parts of his reminiscences ("Memoirs of a Revolutionary," 1973 and "Wartime," 1977), but he regards them as "writings of an impure conscience" marked by previous extreme positions. On the one hand, Djilas wants to present himself as a convert from communism; on the other hand, he still tries to save himself, his revolutionary role and his work. Supek and Djilas had joined the party at the same time (1932) and their development followed parallel lines. Djilas, the former head of the Department for Agitation and Propaganda never owned up to his attacks on the democratic and humanistic values and on political pluralism. According to Supek, Djilas' aversion to the Croats was so great that he was never able to recognize the significance of the struggle for liberation in Croatia, which was based on the principles of the popular front and of political pluralism. Supek is not prepared to shut his eyes to Djilas' attacks on the SIEGEL circle in 1939/40, his criticism of the collaboration of the Croatian Communists' Central Committee with the republican Peasants' Party (1943/44), his destruction of the Tito/Subasic multi-party government (1945), his cultural nihilism of the post-war years, his visits to Stalin aimed at convincing Stalin of the soundness of the Bolshevization of Yugoslavia, or his responsibility for the disappearance of so many comrades-in-arms and innocents--above all of Andrija Hebrang, the CPC secretary and subsequent minister for industry whom Supek considers the protagonist of a pluralist and federative Yugoslavia and the true victor in the partisan war.

The "Praxis" Group and Belgrade Centralism

After 1966 and the overthrow of Rankovic, there set in in Croatia a liberalization in all areas of life, without there having been uttered a single word of criticism of socialism, self-government or even federative structure. Broad segments of the population discussed new ideas concerning pluralism, nation and humanistic universalism. As had been the case in 1939/40, reflections on the withering away of the party, the factor determining all areas of life, gave rise among the Belgrade Communists to negative associations and to the fear of losing control. Thus in December 1971 a new centralization drive was launched. Once again, the mutual trust between the people and the Communists was quelled and branded as nationalism. In Supek's view, the oppositionist "Praxis" group played a contributing role in this. Although the group voiced "unsparing criticism of all existing conditions," this criticism was to be strictly reserved to "Marxist analysis. As early as 1969, the group had proclaimed its creed: "Firstly: We hold that ... the unity of our multinational community can be maintained only on the platform of communist ideas. Secondly: The problem of socialism is not--and cannot be--the dilemma: single-party or multi-party system; rather, it is the question as to the character and role of the proletarian party .... We are for the supremacy of the working class ...." In 1972, the Zagreb "Praxis" group launched a campaign to bring about the removal of Supek--"on account of his unacceptable position regarding the events of the past and on account of his defense of what happened"--from his office of president of the University of Zagreb. In February 1972, when numerous Croatians--accused of nationalism and counterrevolutionary activity--were dismissed from their jobs, defamed and arrested, the oppositionist Belgrade philosophers met in Tara to discuss

nationalism. In his report, M. Markovic stated: "It appears that the most dangerous, acute and visible symptoms of the disease have been eliminated ...." And his colleague S. Stojanovic expressed the fear that Yugoslavia's political development might be harmed "through the establishment of a multi-party system on a national basis." Since they felt that the revolution had the right to defend its achievements, they welcomed the suppression of the liberalization trends in Zagreb.

Supek's Convictions

Supek is not a politician, but a scientist who wants totally to live with his people and to understand its problems. His concern is not Yugoslavia; he is concerned with doing away with the lie that is corrupting life. For this reason, he is rejected in the entire Communist bloc, while his scientific system is condemned as "rightist revisionism" or "bourgeois idealism." Believing in a universalism based on enlightening humanism and in the general validity of science, Supek rebels against the militant avantgarde with its dialectical tricks, which in the name of revolution --as the ultimate justification--commits all kinds of offenses against the people. His alternative to Marxism is a universal humanism that cultivates the past and tries to reform the world in accordance with moral principles. "One must be either blind or stupid to be able to teach the students that freedom appears only after the revolution, while all that precedes the revolution is worthless and subordinate to historical necessity."

Supek is not a dissident such as Djilas or Mikhailov, both of whom seek to base the South Slavic peoples' living together on a merely political solution. In Supek's view, the association of these peoples must be based on a shared existential interest; moreover, mutual respect, tolerance and solidarity must be flexible so as to allow even a growing apart, a breaking away of a people. This is why Supek is a dissident; but he is a dissident also because he opposes not only revolutionary violence, but any violence--as is evidenced by the "humanistic message" at the end of his book which will soon be published in English and in German.

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